The philosopher Julio Cabrera, which I have previously addressed, has another book translated into English. It is called Because I Love You, You Will Not Be Born! and it is a joint reflection about procreation, written with Thiago Lenharo di Santis. The book is half philosophical essay and half novel, aiming to examine what its authors view as the coldness and detachment with which thousands of humans are dumped daily on planet Earth, just for the distraction of their parents or as a mere involuntary product.
The first part is mainly dedicated to Cabrera’s structural mortality claim which I’ve addressed in the post about the book A Critique of Affirmative Morality.
The second part is dedicated to considerations about the decision to generate a new being from the point of view of the ones who are about to be born. This part is written by Thiago di Santis.
The third and last part is called Letters of Abstention and is a fictional correspondence between a young negative philosopher and an austere teacher.
Unfortunately there are relatively few antinatalist books so there is no reason to choose between them, yet if you have to choose just one of Cabrera’s books translated into English, I highly recommend reading Discomfort and Moral Impediment which is undoubtedly one of the best books I’ve ever read.
However there is an unmissable part in Because I Love You, You Will Not Be Born!, surprisingly in the exchange of letters part of the book, where one of the writers decides to synthesize the many questions and discussions detailed along the text, in a table. That is done in hope that after seeing everything together, it becomes clear how sadistic and unscrupulous the procreative attitude is.
Here is the moral mapping of procreation:
Attitude of not having children: | Attitude of having children: |
One makes a sensitive and reflected consideration of the implications, possibilities and perspectives involved in the act of procreation. | An unreflective* and insensitive act of procreation is carried out, unconditionally* yielding to impulses and attempting to exempt oneself from responsibility, with total disregard for rationality and sensitivity, and disregarding* possibilities and perspectives. |
One does not oblige, impose or bestow anyone. (One carries their bag of bricks without forcing anyone to carry another). | Obligation, imposition, bestowal of someone. (One carries their bag of bricks and forces someone to carry another). |
The possibility of participation of the new being in the third group is considered (of being suicidal, for example). | The possibility of participation of the new being in the third group is not considered*. |
The risk of one’s actions remain with the individual who made the decision. One brings responsivity to oneself, one keeps the implications of one’s actions to oneself. | The risk remains with the child, thus expanding beyond those who made the decision. One throws on the shoulders of their children the whole package, with all its implications; from there, the problem is of the new being. |
One answers no to the question: “do you want to be responsible for the existence of a person (without power or knowledge about the decision to make them be) that can be so sensitive to the point of being affected, hurt, devastated, and even destroyed by the pains of existence?”. | One answers yes to the same question. |
One does not oblige the child to pay any debt that they have not incurred. One does not make their children victims of intergenerational tyranny. | The child will have to pay debts (paid every second and impossible to be removed) that they did not incur (which were inherited). There is intergenerational tyranny. |
One considers the possibility of the new being occupying the position of the intense sufferer. | The possibility of the new being occupying the position of the intense sufferer is not considered*. (Including of the one who wants to die and can not). |
One does not impose a mortality on the new being, a life that is terminative, debilitating and self-aware, that frustrates every project and generates insecurity. | One imposes to the new being precisely this type of life. One obliges the new being to a life that is always decadent, in which one suffers actions that cause greater limitations to the human condition. |
One does not oblige or enable the new being to experience the illness and death of the father, mother, son or daughter, relatives, friends, among others, being fully aware of these possibilities. | One obliges or enables the new being to experience the illness and death of all these people, and, in general, the coexistence with the suffering of loved ones. |
One does not condemn the new being to make choices, to go through frustrations and failures. | One condemns the new being to make choices, to go through frustrations and failures, to be disrespected and hindered by the other. |
One does not oblige a sensitive being to pain and suffering, to be a sufferer, subject to the various natural limitations. (By not forcing someone to have a body, no needle can hurt them). | One obliges a sensitive being, of particular perception, to be a sufferer, imbued by the various natural limitations (not chosen and immutable). And all this without any choice, power or responsibility of the new being. (By forcing it to have a body, a needle can always be threaded into it). |
One worries (in X1) with “for whom) the pain would remain. | There is no concern with “for whom” the pain will remain. On the contrary, the exploitation of the new being begins, mentally, already in X1, as part of the practice of an absolutely indefensible attack against the prototypical innocent victim. |
For the already existing individual, there can be resignation to life (it is “like that”), but not to the new being, who was not obliged to the same painful situation. | For the new being, life will be “like that”, just as it is for the already existing individual, because the parents decided for them. |
One either does not fit into any of the three categories (egoism, super-egoism, ultra-egoism), or at most one is characterized as egoistic, or as super-egoistic, or both, about other already existing people. | It is the practice of ultra-egoism par excellence, the maximum degree of egoism (that is, it is the creation a new being only to satisfy oneself). |
One considers the consequences of one’s own action, which may be pleasurable to oneself, but which will be painful to the new being. | One does not consider* the painful consequences to the other, resulting from one’s own satisfaction. |
One does not oblige someone to be an agent of nature (in particular, a reproducer). | The child is obliged to be an agent of the natural system (in particular, a reproducer). |
An attitude of respect for human suffering is adopted, particularly with regard to the child. | An attitude of disrespect or indifference towards human suffering is adopted, particularly in relation to the child. |
One does not oblige the new being to be an agent of the generator’s belief system. One does not force a new being to be a means to anything. The new being is not seen as a means but as an end. | One obliges the child to be a means within the belief systems of the generator. |
The new being is maintained in X1, in the privileged status of the first nothingness, without the perspective of the 2ND nothingness, without limitations, without impotence, without anguish, without pain, without suffering, without worries, without losing oneself every day. | One is obliged to be something and nothing more, at least not much more than being. One is forced into a subtractive and debilitating life, against the second nothingness. One is obliged to a limited existence, of negative potency, impotent, fearful, anguished, worried and painful, of loss of oneself every day. One is obliged to be, “leaving” the privileged status of the first nothingness. |
One hurts the right to be of the non-being, only in X1, that is, it is not an effective injury, since nothing was taken from him, for he simply is not. | One hurts the right to not be of the being, in X2 and forever (something irremediable even with suicide), in addition to the abuse in X1. |
One reacts responsibly to the regencies in force, to the traditional simian inertia. | One repeats the same irresponsible, thoughtless, insensitive, and traditional attitude. |
One does not condemn or sacrifice what would surely exist, that is, the body, sensitivity, thoughts and feelings of the new being, in potential benefit of what may or may not exist. | One sacrifices and condemns what guaranteedly exists: the body, the sensitivity, the thoughts, the feelings of the new being, in potential benefit of what can exist or not. |
The proposal of having the well-being of the new being as one’s main or sole objective is accepted entirely. | The proposal of having the well-being of the new being as one’s main or sole objective is entirely abandoned. |
One answers yes to the question: “would it not be better to satisfy oneself without doing harm to an absolutely innocent individual?” | One answers no to the same question. |
One thought about the motives that the new being would have to be. | One obliges the new being to be, even without any undoubted and necessary reason for all. |
At the moment X1, one thinks about the well-being of the new being, one reveals a moral concern and love for him, for the sensitive and absolutely innocent element. | One does not think about the well-being of the new being, one does not worry about it as such, properly speaking. There is concern and love for oneself, in a very high degree of involvement with oneself. No love is devoted to the sensitive and absolutely innocent element, nor is there any moral concern with it. |
One does not allow a fetishization or objectification of the new being, treating it as non-human. | One utilizes the child as an object, a thing, for one’s own satisfaction. The distinction between a thing and a human is lost, the child becomes a fetish. |
One does not commit a crime to then protect the injured; one thinks before doing so and one decides, first of all, not to make a victim. | One commits a crime whose victim is one’s own child, from which one then tries to spare them (to be victimized by others). |
One thinks of the many difficulties that the new being would live, the necessary conditions of its existence, inherent in the human, and does not oblige it to that. | One does not think about these difficulties. Being human life very difficult (naturally and socially), and even though one can avoid it, one obliges the new being to all this only by virtue of one’s own ultra-egoism. |
In the attempt to reconcile self-satisfaction with the well-being of the new being, the well-being of the new being is prioritized, even to the detriment of one’s own interests (perhaps, to “experience parenthood”). But there is the option of being satisfied in a deeper way, knowing that one is effectively doing the best for the possible new being. | In the attempt to reconcile self-satisfaction with the well-being of the new being, at best, one’s own contentment is prioritized, even with the total and irreversible damage to the new being. In most cases, however, one can not even consider that there is a prioritization, for indifference and insensitivity are such that one does not even realize the existence of the perspective of the new being (completely ignored under the ultra-egoistic view). In these cases, only one thing is seen: “I, I, I…”. |
*If the concern for the son or daughter’s well-being is maintained
X1: This moment is considered to be “existential” in relation to the parents and “pre-existential” in relation to the child (therefore, prior to his existence).
Mother and father already exist and therefore have a physical apparatus developed (brain) and are able to consider the issue of birth consciously, to reason about the aspects involved and to make a decision. Observe that one can make the decision without consciously considering the issue and without reasoning about all the aspects involved (which, in fact, seems to be very common), but at least there is the possibility of making these types of consideration, since the physical apparatus is available for this.
The child, however, does not exist in X1. They have therefore no (cerebral) physical apparatus or any other to consider the issue, there is no consciousness, there is no reasoning, there is no decision-making. If such a tool is not available, it is absolutely impossible that there be any awareness or choice about the issue on the part of the new being.
X2: This moment is considered as the beginning of the existence of the child. From this will occur a series of processes of development of the new individual generated.
X3: This moment is considered as one in which the individual who was before in development is already developed.
The fact that the vast majority of people would still procreate even after reading this list is one of the most unequivocal proofs that us radical antinatalists shouldn’t focus on making lists of arguments aiming at convincing people not to procreate, but focus on lists of technological options aiming at making people unable to procreate.
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