Category: General (Page 5 of 6)

Irrationality

Even if people would do everything in their power so that their children would have good lives, they can never guarantee it (and even more important, in my view, is that it is always guaranteed that their children would harm others). People can’t protect their children from every possible harm even if they’ll always do their best, since many bad things happen to many people independently of their parents’ actions. So obviously and as thoroughly explained in all the former texts in this blog, creating a person is always the wrong decision. In this post I’ll argue that the fact that breeding is always made by creatures who are hardly able to make right and rational decisions, makes it even worse.

Procreation involves creating an extremely vulnerable subject of harm, therefore the ones who decide to do so must be perfect decision makers. But people haven’t proven to be anything close. People are irrational creatures who usually don’t make the right decisions, and all their decisions are shaped and influenced by irrational forces. They tend to think that their decisions were made after they have rationally considered the best possible outcome of any given situation, and that they are in total control of their behavior and perceptions, but the truth is that much of it has very little, and often nothing, to do with the situation at hand and more with internal factors such as their personalities, habits, temperament, previous perceptions, willpower and hidden and explicit motives; and with contingent external factors such as how tired they are, how hungry they are, how thirsty they are, how sexually aroused they are, how comfortable their shoes are, the outside temperature, and etc.

While people like to believe that they are rational and logical, they are significantly influenced by many cognitive biases that constantly distort their assessments, positions, beliefs, judgments and decisions. Here are some common examples:

Status-Quo Bias: Generally, people prefer stability, the familiar, sticking to their routines. Therefore they tend to make decisions which guarantee that things remain more or less the same, even if they can be better, or are currently wrong. Though it makes sense not to fix something that is not broken, the problem is that many things are not even seen as broken because people don’t want to bother fixing them.

Egocentric Bias: People tend to recall the past in a self-serving manner, meaning they “remember” their performances as better than they actually were. One of the consequences is that they make decisions based on false self-perceptions.

Confirmation Bias: People tend to favor (and even remember) information that confirms their positions and actions, and disfavor and disregard (or forget) any information that contradicts or threatens their positions and actions. This bias is so common and so important that I address it separately.

Anchoring Bias: When making decisions, people tend to be overly influenced by the first piece of information they hear about the subject. The rest of the information is assimilated in relation to the first one simply because it was first and therefore was anchored, not because it is more accurate or more important.

Halo Effect: People’s overall impression of someone influences how they view each of that person’s traits, even when there are no causal links or any relevancy between the traits. The most common expression of the bias (and its worst effect) is that people find whom who is more physically attractive to also be smarter and kinder, and even worse, that the less physically attractive are also dumb and evil.

Sunk Cost Fallacy: Also known as Escalation of Commitment, people tend to continue in activities even after realizing that these activities are no longer enjoyable or needed, and often despite that it would take more efforts to complete them than was invested in them in the first place. In other words, people’s decisions are influenced by their cumulative prior investments, and regardless of their need, desire, and often despite new evidence proving this decision wrong.

Ego Depletion: Studies show that willpower is an expendable resource which can be depleted after overuse. In times of overabundance of temptations and stimulations such as ours, it is much easier and very frequent for people’s willpower to be depleted. Therefore, in many cases they unconsciously make decisions which they would have never made hadn’t their willpower been depleted.

Belief Bias: People value the logic of an argument according to the plausibility of its conclusion.

This is one of the biases which most strongly prove how illogical people are, as the logic of an argument, by definition, must be objective and independent of how plausible or desirable the conclusion which is rationally inferred from it is. Otherwise what is the point of logic in argumentation?

Existence Bias: People tend to treat the mere existence of something as evidence of its goodness, and to evaluate an existing state more favorably than its alternatives.

The Optimism Bias: The optimism bias, also referred to as “the illusion of invulnerability”, is people’s built-in cognitive tendency to underestimate their likelihood of experiencing bad things, and overestimate their likelihood of experiencing good things. For example, people underestimate their chances of suffering from diseases or car accidents, no matter how prone they are specifically to be involved in such, or how prevalent diseases and car accidents are in general; and they overestimate their happiness potential no matter their specific living conditions.

Availability Heuristic: When evaluating a specific issue, idea, method or decision, people tend to place greater value on information that comes to their mind more quickly. People give greater credence to immediate examples and tend to overestimate the probability of similar things happening in the future.

Priming: Not only that people’s decisions and judgments are unconsciously affected by stimuli, which in many cases are absolutely irrelevant, such as smells, colors and looks, usually these factors will also affect people’s following decisions and judgments – since primal decisions and judgments affect future ones. In other words, when people are exposed to one stimulus, not only that it affects their current decisions and judgments, but it might also affect their future ones. That is despite that usually the primal stimulus had nothing to do with neither of the cases at hand.

The Consistency Effect – Is a similar and even stronger effect than priming, which basically means that people tend to defend and preserve their positions and behaviors, even if these were decided randomly or without serious observation by the agent. This effect can be an even stronger case of priming since it usually lasts longer, and since it doesn’t necessarily relate to sensual perceptions but to statements and actions performed by a person. Hence, once a person said or did something, it is often much harder to convince that person that s/he is wrong because of their drive to remain consistent (even with random and arbitrary statements and actions), which is usually further fortified by another kind of psychological bias – Self-Justification which is the infamous tendency of people to justify their behavior no matter how incoherent, reasonless and even untypical it is.

Substitution Bias:
When people are confronted with a complex decision, they often automatically and unconsciously substitute it with a less complex one. They seek an easier, more familiar, related problem and apply its easier more familiar solution, to the more complex problem.

Bandwagon Effect: People tend to believe and do things merely since others believe and do them (they jump on the bandwagon).

Default Effect: Studies show that an option is more likely to be chosen by people, regardless of its content, or whether it has advantages over other alternatives, or if it is expected to benefit its choosers, once it is simply (and arbitrarily) set as the default option.

Groupthink: People’s opinions and decisions are shaped, if not suppressed, by other group members who collectively and unconsciously try to reach an agreement, often at the expense of evaluating alternative positions. This tendency results in an irrational and dysfunctional but common decision-making process.

Fluency Bias: People tend to take more seriously ideas which are processed more fluently, and more smoothly, often merely because they were presented more masterfully, not because they are more trustworthy or logical.

Mere Exposure Effect: People tend to favor options merely because they are more familiar with them.

Choice-Supportive Bias: Once a decision is made, people tend to over-focus on its benefits and minimize its flaws.

Gambler’s Fallacy: People tend to think that the likelihood of events which their probability is statistically independent (such as dice rolling or coin flipping), is nevertheless affected by past outcomes. For example, people believe that after two successive heads in coin tossing, it is more likely that the next one would be tails.

Restraint Bias: People tend to overestimate their ability to resist temptations.

Expectation Bias: People are biased by their expectations of a situation, which causes them to believe, confirm, and spread information which correspond with their expectations, and overlook, discard, or downgrade information which is in conflict with their expectations.

Framing Effect: People’s decisions are likely to differ depending on whether the exact same information is presented in one way or in another.

Authority Bias: People tend to ascribe more credibility and are more influenced by authority figures, regardless of the content of their statements.

False Uniqueness Bias: People tend to view themselves as more unique and special than they actually are.

Hyperbolic Discounting: Also known as present-bias, as it regards to people’s tendency to strongly prefer immediate benefits over future ones, despite that their future selves would highly prefer that they wouldn’t make those decisions in the present.

And it’s probably most fitting to end this partial list of cognitive biases with – Bias Blind Spot: People’s tendency not to recognize the effect of biases on their own judgment. Almost all people are sure that they are less biased than others, absolutely convinced that their beliefs, judgments and decisions are all rational, accurate, and bias free. Research has shown that people are still unable to control the effect of biases on their beliefs, judgments and decisions, even after made aware of them, and that further strengthen the fact that they are biased by the Bias Blind Spot.

Every decision people make is never after an independent standalone truly rational examination of the given situation. Every decision is somehow biased, usually by more than one cognitive bias.

It may be worth noting that cognitive biases are not the same as logical fallacies. While it may seem to some that at least theoretically, logical fallacies, which are basically error in logical argumentation, can be fixed by talented, articulate and patient activists, cognitive biases on the other hand, being deeply rooted genuine deficiencies or limitations in people’s thought processing, judgments, memory, attention, valuation, and other mental activities, are here to stay and they constantly distort people’s rational thinking, logic, emotions, believes, positions, perceptions, decisions, and actions.

The fact that people are so unaware of these tremendous forces influencing their decisions makes it even harder to convince them to change their decisions since they are sure that their decisions were made rationally and independently of any external or internal pressure.
If people were rational then in each case they would logically compare all the options and decide upon the expected best outcome in terms of benefit, and not according to the various factors that actually determine their behavior.

People’s thinking and decisions are highly affected by their emotional state. Multiple studies have shown how stress and excitement affect people’s reason and actions. One famous example is lottery sales which sky rocket after events which are considered good, especially unexpected ones. People generally tend to overestimate the chances of something good happening to them, and underestimate the chances of something bad happening to them (the Optimism Bias) and it has an even stronger effect when they have a better mood (which obviously doesn’t really affect the chances of something good happening to them, or that something bad won’t).

Not only that the emotions experienced by people while making a decision sometimes have nothing to do with the issue itself, it is often the case that the effects of the emotions experienced while making a decision can last longer than the emotions themselves. In other words, not only that emotions sometimes have a strong irrelevant effect on an immediate decision, they often affect future decisions as well, and again regardless of the relevancy to the issue itself. That is because in many cases an emotion creates a long-lasting pattern of responses to similar scenarios which correspondingly affects decision making regarding these situations. Or to put it even more bluntly, one initial mistake can start a chain reaction of misguided decisions.

People are sure that they are always in the driver’s seat, at least when it comes to their decisions, and with what happens in their lives. But they are always not, even when it comes to “their” decisions and with what happens in their lives, and to an even greater degree, what happens in others’ lives.
People are merely pawns who are constantly influenced by many forces which they can’t comprehend or are even aware of, not to mention are able to control.

Given how irrational people are, it is irrational to keep using rational arguments expecting to convince them to stop breeding. What is needed is not rational arguments but actions.

References

Bandura, A. (1997). Self-efficacy: The exercise of control. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company.

Baron J (2000). Thinking and deciding (3rd ed.). New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-65030-4.

Barrett LF, Simmons WK (July 2015). Interceptive predictions in the brain. Nature Reviews. Neuroscience. 16(7): 419–29. doi:10.1038/nrn3950. PMC 4731102. PMID 26016744.

Bishop MA, Trout JD (2004). Epistemology and the Psychology of Human Judgment. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-516229-5.

Bornstein RF, Crave-Lemley C (2004). Mere exposure effect. In Pohl RF (ed.). Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. pp. 215–234. ISBN 978-1-84169-351-4. OCLC 55124398.

Dardenne B, Leyens JP (1995). Confirmation Bias as a Social Skill. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. 21 (11): 1229–1239. doi:10.1177/01461672952111011.

De Meza D, Dawson C (January 24, 2018). Wishful Thinking, Prudent Behavior: The Evolutionary Origin of Optimism, Loss Aversion and Disappointment Aversion. SSRN 3108432.

Dwyer, C. P., Hogan, M. J., & Stewart, I. (2014). An integrated critical thinking framework for the 21st century. Thinking Skills & Creativity, 12, 43–52.

Enzle, Michael E.; Michael J. A. Wohl (March 2009). Illusion of control by proxy: Placing one’s fate in the hands of another. British Journal of Social Psychology. 48 (1): 183–200. doi:10.1348/014466607×258696. PMID 18034916.

False Uniqueness Bias (SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY) – IResearchNet 2016-01-13.

Fisk JE (2004). Conjunction fallacy. In Pohl RF (ed.). Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. pp. 23–42. ISBN 978-1-84169-351-4. OCLC 55124398.

Gilovich T (1993). How We Know What Isn’t So: The Fallibility of Human Reason in Everyday Life. New York: The Free Press. ISBN 978-0-02-911706-4.

Gilovich T, Griffin D, Kahneman D (2002). Heuristics and biases: The psychology of intuitive judgment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79679-8.

Gino, Francesca; Sharek, Zachariah; Moore, Don A. (2011). Keeping the illusion of control under control: Ceilings, floors, and imperfect calibration. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 114 (2): 104–114. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2010.10.002.

Hardman D (2009). Judgment and decision making: psychological perspectives. Wiley-Blackwell. ISBN 978-1-4051-2398-3.

Hilbert M (March 2012). Toward a synthesis of cognitive biases: how noisy information processing can bias human decision making. Psychological Bulletin. 138(2): 211–37. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.432.8763. doi:10.1037/a0025940. PMID 22122235.

Hsee CK, Zhang J (May 2004). Distinction bias: misprediction and mischoice due to joint evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 86 (5): 680–95. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.484.9171. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.680. PMID 15161394.

Hoorens V (1993). Self-enhancement and Superiority Biases in Social Comparison. European Review of Social Psychology. 4 (1): 113–139. doi:10.1080/14792779343000040.

Investopedia Staff (2006-10-29). Gambler’s Fallacy/Monte Carlo Fallacy. Investopedia. Retrieved 2018-10-10.

Juslin P, Winman A, Olsson H (April 2000). Naive empiricism and dogmatism in confidence research: a critical examination of the hard-easy effect. Psychological Review. 107 (2): 384–96. doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.2.384. PMID 10789203.0

Kokkoris, Michail (2020-01-16). The Dark Side of Self-Control. Harvard Business Review.

Kruger, J. &Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware of it: How difficulties in recognizing one’s own incompetence lead to inflated self-Assessments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 6, 1121–1134.

Kruger J (August 1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The “below-average effect” and the egocentric nature of comparative ability judgments. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 77(2): 221–32. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.77.2.221. PMID 10474208.

Lichtenstein S, Fischhoff B (1977). Do those who know more also know more about how much they know?. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance. 20 (2): 159–183. doi:10.1016/0030-5073(77)90001-0.

Marks, Gary; Miller, Norman (1987). Ten years of research on the false-consensus effect: An empirical and theoretical review. Psychological Bulletin. 102 (1): 72–90. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.102.1.72.

McKenna, F. P. (1993). It won’t happen to me: Unrealistic optimism or illusion of control?. British Journal of Psychology. 84 (1): 39–50. doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.1993.tb02461.x.

Merkle EC (February 2009). The disutility of the hard-easy effect in choice confidence. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review. 16(1): 204–13. doi:10.3758/PBR.16.1.204. PMID 19145033.

Milgram S (Oct 1963). Behavioral Study of obedience. The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 67 (4): 371–8. doi:10.1037/h0040525. PMID 14049516.

Msetfi RM, Murphy RA, Simpson J (2007). Depressive realism and the effect of intertrial interval on judgements of zero, positive, and negative contingencies. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 60 (3): 461–481. doi:10.1080/17470210601002595. PMID 17366312.

Nickerson RS (1998). Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises. Review of General Psychology. 2 (2): 175–220 [198]. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175.

O’Donoghue T, Rabin M (1999). Doing it now or later. American Economic Review. 89 (1): 103–124. doi:10.1257/aer.89.1.103.

Oswald ME, Grosjean S (2004). Confirmation Bias. In Pohl RF (ed.). Cognitive Illusions: A Handbook on Fallacies and Biases in Thinking, Judgement and Memory. Hove, UK: Psychology Press. pp. 79–96. ISBN 978-1-84169-351-4. OCLC 55124398.

Pacini, Rosemary; Muir, Francisco; Epstein, Seymour (1998). Depressive realism from the perspective of cognitive-experiential self-theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 74 (4): 1056–1068. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.4.1056. PMID 9569659.

Paul W. Glimcher, (2004) Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 189–91

Plous S (1993). The Psychology of Judgment and Decision Making. New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-050477-6.

Pohl RF (2017). Cognitive illusions: Intriguing phenomena in thinking, judgment and memory. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 978-1-138-90341-8.

Pronin E, Kruger J, Savitsky K, Ross L (October 2001). You don’t know me, but I know you: the illusion of asymmetric insight. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 81 (4): 639–56. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.639. PMID 11642351.

Pronin E, Kugler MB (July 2007). Valuing thoughts, ignoring behavior: The introspection illusion as a source of the bias blind spot. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology. 43 (4): 565–578. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.05.011. ISSN 0022-1031.

Schwarz N, Bless H, Strack F, Klumpp G, Rittenauer-Schatka H, Simons A (1991). Ease of Retrieval as Information: Another Look at the Availability Heuristic (PDF). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 61 (2): 195–202. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.61.2.195.

Martin Steve (2012) The Default Effect: How to Leverage Bias and Influence Behavior. Influence at Work

Thompson, Suzanne C.; Armstrong, Wade; Thomas, Craig (1998). Illusions of Control, Underestimations, and Accuracy: A Control Heuristic Explanation. Psychological Bulletin. 123 (2): 143–161. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.123.2.143. PMID 9522682.

West, R. F., Toplak, M. E., & Stanovich, K. E. (2008). Heuristics and biases as measures of critical thinking: Associations with cognitive ability and thinking dispositions. Journal of Educational Psychology, 100, 4, 930–941.

The Impossibility of Escaping Evil

Although less known than his most famous work The Denial of Death, Ernest Becker’s Escape From Evil, is highly recommended (and in my opinion even more interesting and relevant in relation to antinatalism).
I have referred to both books in the text about the harms of death , but naturally, some great quotes had to be left out.
Already in the first two pages there are a couple of passages which hold more wisdom, reason and truth than most books have in them altogether.

So here they are:

“At its most elemental level the human organism, like crawling life, has a mouth, digestive tract, and anus, a skin to keep it intact, and appendages with which to acquire food. Existence, for all organismic life, is a constant struggle to feed-a struggle to incorporate whatever other organisms they can fit into their mouths and press down their gullets without choking. Seen in these stark terms, life on this planet is a gory spectacle, a science-fiction nightmare in which digestive tracts fitted with teeth at one end are tearing away at whatever flesh they can reach, and at the other end are piling up the fuming waste excrement as they move along in search of more flesh. I think this is why the epoch of the dinosaurs exerts such a strange fascination on us: it is an epic food orgy with king-size actors who convey unmistakably what organisms are dedicated to. Sensitive souls have reacted with shock to the elemental drama of life on this planet, and one of the reasons that Darwin so shocked his time-and still bothers ours-is that he showed this bone crushing, blood-drinking drama in all its elementality and necessity: Life cannot go on without the mutual devouring of organisms. If at the end of each person’s life he were to be presented with the living spectacle of all that he had organismically incorporated in order to stay alive, he might well feel horrified by the living energy he had ingested. The horizon of a gourmet, or even the average person, would be taken up with hundreds of chickens, flocks of lambs and sheep, a small herd of steers, sties full of pigs, and rivers of fish. The din alone would be deafening. To paraphrase Elias Canetti, each organism raises its head over a field of corpses, smiles into the sun, and declares life good.” (Escape From Evil Page 1)

“Beyond the toothsome joy of consuming other organisms is the warm contentment of simply continuing to exist-continuing to experience physical stimuli, to sense one’s inner pulsations and musculature, to delight in the pleasures that nerves transmit. Once the organism is satiated, this becomes its frantic all-consuming task, to hold onto life at any cost-and the costs can be catastrophic in the case of man. This absolute dedication to Eros, to perseverance, is universal among organisms and is the essence of life on this earth, and because we are mystified by it we call it the instinct for self-preservation.” (Escape From Evil Page 2)

The Harm of Death – Part 2

The following is the second part of a text about death as a harm. It is highly recommended to read the former part first, but it is not necessary, as while this text functions as an essential elaboration of the former one, it can be read independently of the first part.

The Denial of Death and Terror Management Theory

People tend to deny their fear of death claiming that they don’t think about death often. However, death awareness influences fundamental aspects of everyone’s lives and it motivates many of everyone’s actions.

The cultural anthropologist Ernest Becker argues that death awareness motivates all of humans’ actions and is the main motivational force in everything everyone does.
In his most famous book The Denial of Death he argues that humans are seeking to overcome death through immortality projects – activities which provide a sense of meaning that help them transcend the death of their physical body. These immortality projects are “vital lies” which allow people to function day to day without the disabling awareness of their impending death.

Human culture according to Becker is a product of people trying to solve the problem of death awareness. He defines culture as constrictive believes about the nature of reality that are shared by people in groups in order to minimize the anxiety engendered by cosmological question such as who am I? Where did I come from? Where do I go? And of course when would I die?
Even the most primitive and technologically impoverished human societies, had sophisticated notions about the origin of the universe, and about what happens after death.
Humans use their cognitive capabilities such as thinking abstractedly and symbolically to solve their greatest fear which is their own mortality.
He writes:

“We can see that what people want in any epoch is a way of transcending their physical fate, they want to guarantee some kind of indefinite duration, and culture provides them with the necessary immortality symbols or ideologies; societies can be seen as structures of immortality power.” (Escape From Evil, p. 63)

All cultures offer some hope of immortality, either literally in the form of heavens, afterlife or reincarnation, or symbolically, through producing art, making a great fortune, making scientific discoveries, having children obviously, or any other way of producing the sense that people are part of something greater than themselves that will continue long after they die. People know they will not live forever but are comforted by the possibility that they “live on” symbolically through their work, the people they have known, and of course through their children.

Culture allows people to feel that they are significant contributors to a permanent world. It protects people from the fact that they are temporary, purposeless creatures who are permanently gone once they are dead. People’s belief systems help them manage the terror accompanied with the awareness of their inevitable death.

Truthfulness, empiricism, authenticity and validness are highly insignificant for that matter:

“And as far as means are concerned, we are all equally insignificant and impotent animals trying to coerce the universe, trying to make the world over to our own urges. The cultural lie merely continues and supports the lie of the Oedipal causa sui project; when it is exposed, we literally become impotent. From which we can conclude that man is an animal who has to live in a lie in order to live at all.” (Escape From Evil, p. 122)

According to Becker human civilization is actually a coping strategy.

In the book Escape from Evil, Becker argues that death anxiety is the root cause of human evil.
Basically, the idea is that the beliefs and notions of each culture, by providing a shared conception of reality that protects its members from existential fears regarding their vulnerability and mortality, are so vital for the people belonging to it in terms of confronting death anxiety, that when encountering people with different beliefs and notions, people’s defense mechanisms against death are under a threat. If culture helps people deny their own death, then the very existence of other cultures is a threat to their psychological and emotional stability. Alternative conceptions of reality force people to question their own belief system and therefore their claims to immortality. Since the cultural group people belong to, lives on after their physical death, it symbolically overcomes people’s mortality, when the existence of people’s culture is threatened by another cultural group, it is actually their denial of death mechanism which is threatened, therefore people are highly motivated to maintain their cultural worldview and defeat alternative ones. So the desire to kill whom who belongs to a different belief system is derived from the threat of death, not necessarily in the immediate physical sense but more in the psychological one, it threatens the validity of the denial of death.

Becker argues that in seeking to avoid the evil of death, man is “responsible for bringing more evil into the world than organisms could ever do merely by exercising their digestive tracts. It is man’s ingenuity, rather than his animal nature, that has given his fellow creatures such a bitter earthly fate.” (Escape From Evil, p. 5)

Aspects of Ernest Becker’s theoretical formulations have been verified by hundreds of studies conducted by social and evolutionary psychologists who developed Becker’s ideas into the Terror Management Theory. Basically, the theory is that humans’ evolutionary drive for self-preservation and their awareness of the certainty and unpredictability of death means they must constantly deal with an internal conflict which results in mental terror. That terror is managed by cultural beliefs of meaning and purpose aiming to subdue the inevitable biological reality.
These researchers have empirically studied the effect of death awareness on human attitudes and behavior. For example, they reminded some people of their mortality by asking them to write about their feeling regarding their own death, or by filling out a death anxiety questionnaire, some watched car accidents, some were brought to the lab through a cemetery, and some were flashed with the word death in a millisecond time so they weren’t aware of it. The results were that people in the control group, who were reminded of unpleasant events but not fatal ones, didn’t show any special relation to people of their group, but people who were reminded of their mortality showed signs of more supportiveness to their own group.  In other words, after subjects were subliminally confronted with reminders of death they more strongly endorsed the worldview of their own ethnic group or nation, while at the same time, they denigrated members of other groups whose worldviews differed from their own.

In another study, judges who were exposed to the word “death” before ruling, administered far more punitive sentences than judges in the control group who were not reminded of their own mortality. Meaning, being reminded of death caused judges to be stricter with people who break the codes of society.
Similar studies show that people who were subliminally reminded of their own mortality tended to be more judgmental of people of other cultures and more tolerant of people from their own culture.

The mere exposure to the word “death” also affected political choices. For example, two post 9/11 studies found that subjects in the high death awareness group favored a candidate who they perceived as a savior or demagogue and who insisted on an aggressive agenda toward their enemies over one who urged a more diplomatic path.

If merely subliminally introducing the word “death” in an experiment can produce measurable changes in subjects’ attitudes and actions, one can only imagine the powerful effect of countless events in the real world that remind people of their mortality. People see death in the news and on the internet all the time, some witness horrible accidents on the streets, people often hear about the death of a family member, a friend, a neighbor or even a celebrity, all are mortality reminders that seriously affect people, despite that many of them have seemingly became accustomed to the visual images of tragedies as a result of daily exposure. These still have a profound influence on people’s unconscious minds and significantly alter their motivations and behaviors.

Becker doesn’t only argue that death anxiety is the root cause of human evil because anyone who thinks otherwise is a threat to the defense mechanisms one has against death, he also thinks that since people need some tangible and potentially controllable cause of their residual death anxiety, they identify or create “others” to serve this purpose. The “others” function as the source of all evil. Every bad thing happening to “us” is because of “them”. We are always right and good and they are always wrong and bad. People need an explanation for why life is not good and they don’t want to blame themselves, so not only that they falsely blame others, hadn’t there been “others”, people would invent them to serve the function of the source of all evil. Otherwise it is their own fault or just the way things are, and both notions are not desirable.

If Ernest Becker is right, then people are not expected at some point to forsake war, hate, xenophobia, racism, or religions, as they are all powerful antidotes against death anxiety, especially religions. Studies have found that death anxiety tends to be lower among people who regularly participate in religious activities. For example, a study conducted among people who regularly attend church, asking them to fill out “Intrinsic Religious Motivation Scale”, and “Death Anxiety Scale”, found an inverse relationship between intrinsic religious motivation and death anxiety. So if Becker is right and if as this study suggests – the more religious people are the less anxious they are about death, religion would remain attractive to many people, and these are very bad news for antinatalism.

I am not sure that death awareness is the center and the cause of each element in human life, but I do agree that it plays some part in most if not all of them. I think that there are other motives that also play roles in human culture, but death awareness resulted in death anxiety which leads humans to try and protect themselves by mechanisms of denial of death exemplified by various culture elements, is surly one of the main ones.

According to Becker, people are not only bothered with the end of their lives, but to a great deal, with the insignificance of their lives. People need to believe that as individuals they serve a valuable and significant role in a meaningful universe. He writes in his book Escape from Evil: “Man wants to know that his life has somehow counted, if not for himself, then at least in a larger scheme of things, that it has left a trace, a trace that has meaning.” (p. 4)

And in The Denial of Death: “The real world is simply too terrible to admit, it tells man that he is a small, trembling animal who will decay and die. Illusion changes all this, makes man seem important, vital to the universe, immortal in some way.” (p. 61)
According to Becker, humans deny that death is the final destiny for them, by striving to achieve a life that is significant. If one’s legacy lives on, then death is not one’s final destiny.
And the easiest way for people to delude themselves that their legacy lives on after their death, is by creating new people. Not everyone can make their life meaningful in the cultural sense but almost everyone can delude themselves that their lives are meaningful by creating new people.

Even if you don’t agree with every part of Becker’s theory, procreation surly is at least partly a result of death anxiety. Procreation provides people with an illusion of immortality and an illusion of meaning in a meaningless world.

Children are a manifestation of people’s false effort to live beyond their bodies. They reflect the hope that a part of them would live on through their offspring as well as through the memories of them held by their children. That’s at least one of the reasons people are so eager to procreate. Their death anxiety is soothed to some extent by believing that they live on through their children, and their children’s children.
Research around the world confirms that reminders of death increase the desire for children in the service of symbolically transcending death. German participants who wrote the first sentence that came to mind while thinking about their own death subsequently reported a greater desire to have children, and to have them sooner, than participants who were asked to write about being in pain. After being primed with death thoughts, Chinese participants were more resistant to the nation’s one-child-per-family policy, and American participants indicated that they were more likely to name future offspring after themselves.

Unfortunately, as horrible as death anxiety is on the personal and on the social level, it doesn’t cause people not to procreate but the other way around. Death anxiety creates, if to borrow one of Benatar’s metaphors, a procreation Ponzi scheme, as each generation deals with it by creating new people who are bound to deal with it as well, and are most likely to do so by creating new people and so on and so forth.

So the effect of death anxiety is actually triple:
1) It causes people to fear their own and others’ death
2) It causes people to engage in pointless and usually harmful projects (nationalism, religions, cults, hate groups, gaining power, fame and wealth and etc.) in order to cope with the awareness of their own inevitable deaths
3) And it causes people to develop defense mechanisms against it, which one of the main ones is creating more people, who would also fear their own and others’ death, and would also develop defense mechanisms to deal with their death anxiety which one of the main mechanisms would be creating more people and so on and so forth.

Creating new people functions as filling up the void of meaningfulness, as well as a symbol of people’s continuousness. One of the grimmest evidences of that, and of the death anxiety theory, is that catastrophes, on the national level as well as on the personal level, instead of making people reassess life, usually result in a baby boom.

So there is no point telling people that catastrophes are around the corner or that life is meaningless or that their children would necessarily die. Life is so ironic and humanity is so hopeless that the most rational arguments against procreation might be a two-edged sword.
And that’s one of the reasons why it is not rational arguments that we need…

References

Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press

Becker, E. (1975). Escape from evil. New York: Free Press

Becker, E. (1971). The birth and death of meaning (2nd ed.). New York: Free Press

Feldman, F. Some puzzles about the evil of death in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S. (2015) The worm at the core: on the role of death in life.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627–637.

Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and social behavior: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 61–139). New York: Academic Press.

Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991a). A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of selfesteem and cultural worldviews. Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 24, pp. 91-159 ). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Rosenblatt, A., Veeder, M., Kirkland, S., & Lyon, D. (1990). Evidence for terror management theory II: The effects of mortality salience reactions to those who threaten or bolster the cultural worldview. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 308-318.

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Pinel, E., Simon, L., & Jordan, K. (1993). Effects of self-esteem on vulnerability-denying defensive distortions: Further evidence of an anxiety-buffering function of self-esteem. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 29, 229-251.

Jeroen Vaes, Paul G. Bain & Brock Bastian (2014): Embracing Humanity in the Face of Death: Why Do Existential Concerns Moderate Ingroup Humanization?, The Journal of Social Psychology, DOI: 10.1080/00224545.2014.953027

Luper, S. Annihilation in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

McGregor, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. 2012: “Better No Longer To Be: The Harm of Continued Existence” The South African Journal of Philosophy

Nagel, T. (1970) Death Noûs, Vol. 4, No. 1 pp. 73-80

Pitcher, G. The misfortunate of the dead in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Rosenbaum, S. How to be dead and not to care in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Suits, D. B. Why death is not bad for the ones died in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Viorst, J. (1986) Necessary Losses. New York: Simon and Schuster

The Harm of Death – Part 1

The inevitableness of mortality, meaning the fact that everyone necessarily has to die, is a very common antinatalist argument.

Basically the argument is that it is wrong to create an unnecessary life that would necessarily end, but it has some variations and accentuations.
Versions of the mortality argument such as the one of Julio Cabrera, or the one of David Benatar, were already addressed here and here.

Other antinatalists argue that imposing existence which obviously necessarily ends with the death of the created creatures, is imposing death on those created creatures. And knowingly creating creatures who would necessarily die is at least a form of infliction of death, if not murder.

Some mention the harm of dying, pointing at the fact that rarely people, and all the more so other animals, die without suffering. Obviously I agree that unfortunately this is true, but in my view that is part of the argument that suffering is inevitable in existence, not that death is a harm in itself regardless of how it is experienced. The problem with the fact that most creatures are suffering while dying, is the suffering. And that suffering is a reason not to procreate even if it wasn’t part of dying. And on the other hand, according to the mortality argument, even if death didn’t usually involve suffering it would have still been a harm and a reason not to procreate, so I think we should separate the two arguments.

Some claim that death is bad for the person who died because it frustrates the wishes of the dead. This position is often referred to as the deprivation account, and I disagree with it. The dead can’t be frustrated. There is no one who experiences the loss of the goals which were not accomplished. No one is there anymore to be a victim of this “frustration”, or to be deprived of anything. The dead can’t experience any of the effects of their death. In fact they can’t experience anything hence can’t be deprived of anything. A state can’t be bad for someone if it doesn’t have bad consequences for that someone (or any consequences whatsoever in the case of death). A person who no longer exists is not harmed by the fact that things that that person wanted to happen didn’t happen as a result of its death.
Death can’t be harmful for the dead because it is the end of their existence, and harms are relevant only in existence. Death can be bad only for the living because it threatens to end their existence (that is of course except for the ones who wish for their existence to end).

According to the deprivation account, the essence of what is bad in death is that by dying people don’t get what they desire and plan for had they not died, and they are deprived of a better possibility. But if what is bad about death is that people’s desires would remain unfulfilled, then it is not death which is bad but life, since the dead no longer desire anything or are frustrated by anything, however the living are always frustrated by numerous unfulfilled desires. In death no one experiences anything, it is in life that no one ever gets exactly what they desire and plan for, let alone exactly when they want it. The dead indeed don’t get what they would have desired had they not died, but they don’t experience the situation of not getting what they would have desired had they not died since once dead there are no longer any experiences, desires, and frustrations. Experiences can only take place in the domain of an existing subject, they don’t remain after death, floating above the place where the subject died.

For a possibility of a better option to be harmful, it needs to be experienced by a subject, not merely be a possibility. Possibilities are not moral entities, only subjects are. And since death is precisely the termination of a subject, there is no longer a morally irrelevant entity to be harmed, or be deprived of any possibility. In other words, only if the dead could have experienced the deprivation of a good possibility, its absence could have been harmful.

Ironically, the deprivation account, probably the most common argument for why death is bad for the person who died, is a serious indictment against life, as it is only in life that the deprivation account is relevant, and in fact extremely prevalent since no one’s desires are ever fully and immediately satisfied, and so everyone is always deprived of something, at least to some extent, and also since it seems that according to the deprivation account, people need not to experience a deprivation of a better possibility to be harmed, but merely the hypothetical option of a better possibility is sufficient to harm them. That claim makes life actually even much worse than most antinatalists think, since there is always a better possible option for any given situation, so if people are harmed merely by the possibility of better options, they are most definitely numerously harmed in each and every single moment of their lives.

Having said all that, I totally agree that death is a serious harm and a very good reason to never procreate but not because death is in itself a harm for the person who died, but because a person’s death is a harm for other people who cared about that person, and because that person, like most people, was aware of the fact that s/he would someday die, and that awareness had many harmful implications on that person while s/he was alive. Although a person can’t be harmed by its own death as the dead don’t experience anything anymore, a person is definitely harmed by being aware of its inevitable death, more or less all along its life. And that is the version of the death argument which is in the center of this text.

Death Anxiety

Death is a very serious harm because of the feeling of loss, but not the loss felt by the one who died as the one who no longer exists doesn’t experience any loss (or anything at all), but the feeling of loss by the ones who didn’t die and cared about the one that did.
Death is a very serious harm not because the dead experience something negative in death (or anything at all), but because the living experience something negative while being aware of their own inevitable death.
Death is a very serious harm not because it ended the existence of the one who died as the one who died doesn’t experience the end of its existence (or anything at all), but because it affected the existence of the person who died for almost its entire life.

The harm of death to the person who dies is a bit tricky, it is relevant only as long as death doesn’t come. For the person who dies, death is a harm as a threat, and as long as that person is alive. The harm of death is mainly manifested as death anxiety.

People are forced to live with the awareness that they would die. People are also forced to live with the awareness that other people they care about would die. Not only that, people are also forced to live with the awareness that they and other people they care about can die at any given moment, and often for reasons that they can’t anticipate or control.
Children are forced to live with the awareness that their parents might die, and from a very very young age (from the age of three and usually before they are six). And eventually they realize that their own death is also unavoidable.

The fact that anyone can die anytime, anywhere, by anything, along with the fact that in many cases there is no causal link between death and a person’s behavior – meaning, someone can be very responsible in terms of safety, security, avoiding risks, diet, fitness, sleeping time, health checkups, stress level and etc., yet get killed by an accident which was absolutely not by that person’s fault or lack of caution (drunk driver who ran a red light or mass shooting or whatever scenario that comes to mind in which the person who died couldn’t avoid or anticipate its death) – leads to much of the death anxiety.

Death is a harm not only because every created person has to endure its own mortality but because every created person has to endure others’ mortality. Many people who lose those whom they love find it too hard to overcome the loss, and some remain “stuck” in the mourning process, being immersed in a state of intense continuous grief, sorrow, anger, guilt, self-hatred or depression.
The death of loved ones may have long-term harmful effects on the mental and physical health of people, putting them at a greater risk of depression, illness, accidents, addictiveness to smoking, drinking, drugs, and to suffer from depression and various other psychological disturbances.
And the harm of losing people is not just when and after it actually happens, but it also results from the constant anxiety of losing loved ones. And the fact that it can happen anytime, anywhere, and by anything, is a significant factor of the death anxiety.

People don’t make peace with the fact that death is inevitable and is often very unpredictable. This cognitive problem creates a lot of anxiety and it has various effects in many aspects of human life, most of it is unconscious. In the following text I’ll elaborate about the most famous and substantial theory for that matter, Ernest Becker’s denial of death.
In its more tangible effect death anxiety is associated with: phobias, anxiety disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder, depression, eating disorders, somatic symptom disorder and etc.
Some people become depressed, rigid, cynical or hateful toward self and others.
Many embrace religious or other dogmas that promise afterlife.
Others seek salvation in the form of a guru, a political figure, or a relationship with a partner.
And many seek to accumulate power and wealth unconsciously motivated by the false belief that it would provide them with invincibility.
Probably the least harmful impact, at least potentially, is people seeking symbolic immortality in creative productions and investment in positive causes. Unsurprisingly that path is not very popular. And unfortunately the most common path is also the worst one. Most people seek symbolic immortality by creating biological copies of themselves.

Ironically and tragically, death anxiety causes people to create more people. That is despite that people can’t produce people who are not aware of their own mortality, and despite that they can’t prevent their death anxiety. Procreation is an inevitable passing of unavoidable anxiety.
Procreating is creating a person who would be negatively affected by being aware that its existence is bound to end with death, which can happen at any given moment.

The never to have been, never has to deal with death anxiety. However, every created (human) person has to die and to fear its own death. And also the death of others. Anyone who ever deeply cared about someone, especially if they were ill, knows how terrible death anxiety is. The never to have been, never has to deal with the anxiety about the death of others, and others don’t have to deal with anxiety about that person’s death.

Pro-Natalisn as Pro-Mortalism

Death anxiety is inevitable. Ironically many pro-natalists are trying to counter the mortality argument by claiming that death is part of life, totally missing that that is exactly the point. Had no one been forced into life no one would have to die. The fact that death is part of life is not a reason to accept it but the other way around.
And by that I don’t imply that life is good otherwise why would death be such a bad thing?
One can think that life is bad and that death is bad as well despite that death ends life. The reason there is no contradiction is because life can be bad for someone who might even want to end it but not by death. That may sound ridiculous because death is the end of life, but that is part of the horror of life, it can only end by death. There is no way to simply disappear without feeling a thing, and more importantly as if a person never existed. Had that been an option, many more people would have ended their lives. Most don’t do that because despite that they really don’t want to live, they are biologically built to fear death, many are afraid of not dying while trying to die and therefore ending up in an even worse situation than they were before trying to die, and many are afraid to hurt people who care about them. That’s why if there was a button that can immediately painlessly totally erase the existence of a person so that anyone who knew that person would magically forget that that person ever existed, many would unhesitatingly press that button.
Death anxiety is not the only reason why many people don’t bring their own death but it is a significant part of the reason. And these people who don’t want to live but are afraid to die are doubly victimized. Life that they want to end was imposed on them, as well as the fear to end it.

Unfortunately, this question is not very likely to receive a serious reply. It is more likely that more or less the following dead-end dialog would take place:
Antinatalist: Why would you want your own child to die?
Pro-natalist: I don’t want my child to die, I want my child to live
Antinatalist: But before your child was created it didn’t exist, you have created your child. There was no one and then you have decided to create someone. And that someone has to die. Your child wouldn’t have to die had you never created it. Your child didn’t have to live, there was no one there who had to live or die before you decided to create it, and now that you did, it has to die. So again, why do you want your children to die?
Pro-natalist: Again, I don’t want my children to die, I want my children to live.
Antinatalist: But before a person exists it doesn’t need nor wants to exist since there is no one there to need or want anything. However once that person was created by you, it feels a need and a want to continue to exist and that person, your child, eventually has to die. And so by creating a person you simultaneously created its feeling of need and want to continue to exist, as well as its inevitable death, which that person is going to fear from its entire life.
Your children didn’t want to live before you forced them to live. It was your want that created their life. They didn’t ask to be born, life were forced on them. Everyone is forced into a purposeless existence which inevitably ends with their death. So what is the point?
Pro-natalist: The point is that before anyone die they live.
Antinatalist: But there is no reason for them to live besides your desire of having children. And there is no way to avoid their death. Do you think that your desire to have children should overpower your own children’s desire not to die, as well as the death anxiety that would affect them their entire lives?
Me: I know I am supposed to provide some answer to the last question, but I honestly can’t think of even a very lame one.

People don’t have to create people, however people have to die. And since people know that they don’t have to create people but that if they will, the people they are creating have to die, how is it not forcing them to die?

If you find this brief predicted dialog more or less familiar, and if you find yourself relating to the frustration, maybe it is time to rethink this approach.

References

Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press

Becker, E. (1975). Escape from evil. New York: Free Press

Becker, E. (1971). The birth and death of meaning (2nd ed.). New York: Free Press

Feldman, F. Some puzzles about the evil of death in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S. (2015) The worm at the core: on the role of death in life.

Luper, S. Annihilation in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

McGregor, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. 2012: “Better No Longer To Be: The Harm of Continued Existence” The South African Journal of Philosophy

Nagel, T. (1970) Death Noûs, Vol. 4, No. 1 pp. 73-80

Pitcher, G. The misfortunate of the dead in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Rosenbaum, S. How to be dead and not to care in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Suits, D. B. Why death is not bad for the ones died in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Viorst, J. (1986) Necessary Losses. New York: Simon and Schuster

The Consent Argument

One of the most popular antinatalist arguments is that procreation is wrong since it is impossible to obtain the consent of the created person.
In addressing this argument I have decided to focus on Seana Shiffrin’s article Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm. That is despite that Shiffrin doesn’t even aim at making an antinatalist argument, but argues for a more equivocal stance toward procreation. Shiffrin is mostly concerned with the ease with which society refuses to impose liability on parents despite that they “subject their future children to harm and substantial risk by bringing them into existence” (p. 148). However, I think that in her course of challenging some of the false philosophical premises against ‘wrongful life’ liability, and the current juridical policy toward issues involving procreation and parent–child relations, she makes a very substantial antinatalist case.

Harms and Benefits

Like Benatar, Shiffrin also argues that there is an asymmetry between benefits and harms (which she thinks are not two ends of a scale, and are often absolutely independent states of a positive and a negative kind), but as opposed to Benatar’s version, hers doesn’t stem from advantageousness of non-existence over existence, but from consent.

Shiffrin’s argument relies on the ethical premise regarding benefits and harms with no consent – while it is morally permissible to inflict harm without consent to prevent a greater harm, it is impermissible to inflict harm without consent in order to bestow a benefit.
She exemplifies:

“Absent evidence that the person’s will is to the contrary, it is permissible, perhaps obligatory, to inflict the lesser harm of a broken arm in order to save a person from significant greater harm, such as drowning or brain damage from oxygen deprivation. But, it seems wrong to perform a procedure on an unconscious patient that will cause her harm but also redound to her greater, pure benefit. At the very least, it is much harder to justify. For example, it seems wrong to break an unconscious patient’s arm even if necessary to endow her with valuable, physical benefits, such as supernormal memory, a useful store of encyclopedic knowledge, twenty IQ points worth of extra intellectual ability, or the ability to consume immoderate amounts of alcohol or fat without side effects. At the least, it would be much harder to justify than inflicting similar harm to avert a greater harm, such as death or significant disability.” (p.127)

Therefore, despite that as opposed to Benatar Shiffrin thinks that being created can overall benefit a person, she argues that procreation is morally problematic since all existing persons suffer harms, and it is impossible to secure their consent before being created.
Even if the pleasures of life can be seen as advantages over non-existence, it is morally wrong to impose preventable harms on others without their consent. Harming others without their consent is permissible only to prevent greater harm. Since this is never the case when it comes to procreation, creating someone is an unmistakable violation of this ethical principle.

Shiffrin argues that even though people can benefit their offspring by creating them, they also impose serious harms upon them:

“By being caused to exist as persons, children are forced to assume moral agency, to face various demanding and sometimes wrenching moral questions, and to discharge taxing moral duties. They must endure the fairly substantial amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, significant disappointment, distress, and significant loss that occur within the typical life. They must face and undergo the fear and harm of death. Finally, they must bear the results of imposed risks that their lives may go terribly wrong in a variety of ways. All of these burdens are imposed without the future child’s consent. This, it seems, is in tension with the foundational liberal, anti-paternalist principle that forbids the imposition of significant burdens and risks upon a person without the person’s consent. Doing so violates this principle even if the imposition delivers an overall benefit to the affected person. Hence, procreation is a morally hazardous activity because in all cases it imposes significant risks and burdens upon the children who result. The imposition of significant burdens and risks is not a feature of exceptional or aberrant procreation, but of all procreation.” (p.137)

Common Objections to the Consent Argument

Some object the consent argument, claiming that consent can be hypothetically assumed. Shiffrin opposes this claim for four reasons:
(1) Great harm is not at stake if one is not being created
(2) If one is being created, the harms suffered may be very severe
(3) The imposed harms of life cannot be escaped without high costs
(4) The hypothetical consent procedure is not based on features of the individual who will bear the imposed condition but on a false attempt to universalize preferences of benefits

Others are objecting the idea that it is the parents who are imposing the serious harms.
Shiffrin replies:

“one might resist the claim that because existence may deliver harms, the creator who causes a person to exist causes her harm. One might object that placing someone in a condition where she will necessarily suffer harm is not the same as causing her harm. In some sense, the condition inflicts the harm, not the agent. But this observation seems tangential to assessments of responsibility. If an agent places a patient in the path of an evident, oncoming avalanche that will break her arm, it seems fair to say that the agent harms the patient; at the least (and sufficient for my purposes), the agent is accountable and responsible for the harm the patient suffers—even if the agent does not break the arm directly through his action, does not seek the harm and even tries to prevent it (as may happen in cases of deliberate action resulting in foreseen, but unintentional harm).” (p.125)

Another attempt to counter the consent argument is by claiming that it is impossible to receive consent from non-existing persons.
First of all, the impossibility to obtain consent to inflict harms isn’t a justification to impose them anyway, especially when there is no harm involved in not creating someone. In fact, procreation is exactly the case in which there shouldn’t be a doubt that we mustn’t act in ways that might harmfully affect someone without consent, since not procreating is the surest way not to harm someone without consent.

Secondly, it’s plausible to argue that an existing person acts wrongly towards someone who couldn’t give consent, if as a result of that action, there would be a person who is harmed with no consent. Shiffrin claims on that matter that: “If our actions now set into motion causal chains that will result in a right’s being violated in the future, this action is, at best, morally problematic.” (p.138)

More in this context, some try to refute the consent argument by attempting to turn it on its head, claiming that following the logic of antinatalists, if we need to obtain a person’s consent to be created we must also obtain a person’s consent not to be created. In other words, if consent is important, how come antinatalists are asking for one only in cases of creating a person but not in cases of not creating a person?
However, there is a fundamental difference between the case where there is no existing person yet but there is going to be, and the case where there will never be an existing person. In both cases it is impossible to obtain consent before making a decision, but in the case of procreation the consent of the person who will be affected by that decision is required, while in the case of not creating a person there is no person who will be affected by that decision. There is no and never will be a person who needs to consent to harms that would never be caused to that person.

There is no need to ask someone to consent to not being created, because there is no such someone and because there are no harms that need to be consented to.
When people decide to create a person, that person’s consent is needed because once created that person would necessarily and inevitably be harmed. But that is not the case when people decide not to create a person, because then there is no person at all, let alone one who would necessarily and inevitably be harmed. Creating a person is necessarily forcing something on someone. Not creating a person is necessarily not forcing anything on anyone.

The fact that someone didn’t exist before being created doesn’t change the fact that once created that someone exists without giving consent to its own existence. Consent is relevant because someone will exist and will be harmed during existence. Had that someone not been created, there would have been no existing person who is affected by not being created and therefore there would be no need to obtain consent.

This claim implies that if creating a person is to force existence on people, then not creating people is to force nonexistence on people. But it is impossible to force nonexistence because nonexistence is not a state anyone can be in. Only existence can be forced. And in fact, existence can only be forced since existing people never give consent to be created.
There are no persons whose nonexistence was forced on them for the simple reason that there is no such thing as persons who were never created and there is no such thing as nonexistence. However, existence does exist, and it was forced on everyone who was ever created, exactly because consent could never be obtained. Nonexistence can never be forced on anyone, and existence can only be forced, and it is forced on everyone.

And finally, pro-natalists object the consent argument by claiming that most people state that their life is worth living, and by that they are expressing their consent retroactively.
But for people to be able to give a retroactive consent for their creation, they must also be able to retroactively decline it, and they can’t. No one can undo its own existence. People can end their existence, but they can’t retroactively cancel it. As I broadly explained in the text about suicide, this option is extremely problematic in itself, and is irrelevant to the case of consent since killing oneself doesn’t retroactively cancel a person’s existence, it doesn’t retroactively offset all the suffering that that person experienced, and it would probably cause additional suffering to anyone who cares about that person. If created people can’t really retroactively reject their creation, then they also can’t retroactively give their consent. Creation was forced on all people, and once they exist none really has a choice in terms of consent, even the ones who state that they are happy that they were created.

The impossibility to obtain a unanimous consent, beforehand, from everyone who would ever live, and from everyone who would ever be harmed by everyone who would ever live, is sufficient to construct a valid antinatalist argument in my view. But even under much less radical criterions, even if you disagree that it is wrong to cause someone harm without that person’s consent, even if you disagree that pleasures are not really good as claimed in the post about Benatar’s asymmetry,  and even if you disagree that the reason most people feel that their lives are worth living is not because their lives are really good but mostly because of various psychological mechanisms, still, if consent is derived from the claim that life is worth living, then the ones who feel that their lives are not worth living, don’t give consent retroactively. And since no one can tell whether the lives of the persons they are creating would be found worth living by the persons created, what this claim actually implies is that the majority’s supposed retroactive consent should trample the minority who don’t retroactively give consent to their harms.

This claim is even more atrocious given that non-existing persons are not being harmed by not experiencing the good parts of life had they never existed, while existing persons are harmed by experiencing the bad things in lives. The fact that there are people who feel that their lives are not worth living, despite the allegedly good parts of life, is sufficient for all procreations to be morally unjustified. There are many people who feel that their lives are not worth living, but even if there were few, it doesn’t matter how many people feel this way, the proportions between the ones who feel that their lives are not worth living and the ones who feel they are worth living, are morally irrelevant since no one is harmed by not being created, and the ones who feel that their lives are not worth living are definitely harmed by being created. Had none of them existed, none of them would have been harmed.

Abstaining from procreation won’t cause any harm to anyone who wasn’t created. But a person who doesn’t consent to the miserable life forced upon it, is being severely harmed with no justification, no compensation, and the ‘way out’ option – suicide, although can stop future suffering, it can’t retroactively justify it, and has additional tremendous costs.

Every new person created is a new chance for a person who won’t retroactively give consent to be created, therefore every procreation is morally wrong.

The Harm to Others

In my view, the most important aspect of the consent argument, is one which I have yet to come across in this context – the harm to others.
Not only the person who is about to be created, is going to be harmed as a result of its existence, but also thousands of others who would be harmed as part of providing the living support for that person. A “support” none of them has ever given consent for. In this case I think it is safe to say that hypothetical consent won’t be given. No sentient creature would give consent to be harmed so a person who doesn’t even exist yet, would benefit.
Considering the harms to others, counterarguments such as hypothetical consent or that it is illogical to ascribe consent to non-existing persons, is irrelevant. Existing sentient creatures who will be harmed by a person who will be created, will most certainly not give their consent to be harmed by that person and for that person’s sake.

Before discussing the relevancy and feasibility of obtaining consent to be harmed from a person who doesn’t yet exist, we must obtain consent from everyone who would be harmed by that person’s existence. Even if we could have obtained consent from non-existing persons before creating them, we first must ask everyone who would be sacrificed and otherwise harmed by these persons. We must get their consent to be genetically modified so they would provide the maximum meat possible for the to-be born persons. We must get their consent to be imprisoned for their entire lives. We must get their consent to live without their family for their entire lives. We must get their consent to suffer chronic pain and maladies. We must get their consent to never breathe clean air, walk on grass, bath in water, and eat their natural food. We must get their consent to be violently murdered so the to-be born could consume their bodies. We must get their consent to destroy their habitats, pollute their land, water, and air.
But no one is asking them. And it is not even because everyone knows they would never give their consent, but because others’ harms matter so little to people, that no one even thinks they must be asked.

And one last point. Since this blog is actually a call for an operative antinatalist resolution, it is important to indicate that behind the consent argument there is a firm objection to the inherent coercion of procreation. This is an important note since some might oppose the forced sterilization call as an operative antinatalist resolution, due to its coercive aspect. But given that the only way to cease the inherent coercion of procreation is with the inherent coercion of forced sterilization, clearly for the long run that resolution holds much less coercion than letting procreation continue on its horrendous course. The number of individuals who would have to endure coercion of all kinds in the future if it won’t happen, is practically infinite. In fact, even without considering everyone who would ever exist, the number of individuals who endure coercion of all kinds in the present, already defeats the number of people who need to be sterilized.
Coercion is unavoidable, the question is of extent. It is either that people would continue to decide for other people that they would exist, generation after generation after generation, and for other creatures that they would have to be exploited, suffer and be sacrificed for the sake of the people they insist on creating, or that we decide for one generation only that they won’t procreate. There is no way around it, decisions are anyway being made for others, the question is will it be only the decision not to procreate and for one generation only, or the decision to feel pain, to fear, to be bored, to be disappointed, to be sad, to be lonely, to be purposeless, to die, to fear of dying and many other sources of suffering, and for generation after generation after generation after generation…
Refusing force sterilization on the current generation is forcing endless suffering on an endless number of individuals. The coercion involved in forced sterilization is for one generation only. The coercion involved in the refusal to forced sterilization can last until the sun burns out.

References

Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Shiffrin, Seana. Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm
Legal Theory 5, no. 2 (1999): 117–48

Singh, A. Assessing anti-natalism: A philosophical examination of the morality of procreation (University of Johannesburg 2011)

Suicide

Suicide is often used by pro-natalists to counter antinatalism. The issue is usually brought up in three different ways. The most common mention of suicide is one of various verbal vomits such as ‘if you think life is so bad why don’t you kill yourself’. I will not discuss this specific use of suicide in the following text, not only because it’s ignorant and idiotic, but mainly since this “argument” is so detached from any antinatalist argument that it is not even relevant to refute it. It simply has nothing to do with antinatalism. Therefore as common as this stupid evasion is, I’ll skip it and focus on the other two.
The second one is an attempt to refute the antinatalist claim that procreation is morally wrong since life is a harm, by stating that only a tiny minority of people carry out suicide, therefore procreation is not a harm and life is not as horrible as antinatalists claim it is.
The third one is an attempt to suggest a solution – if life is so horrible for a person, suicide is always an option. Although this claim is often used in a cynical manner, it can also be seriously used as a counter argument for antinatalism and so despite that it is giving it more credit than it actually deserves, this is how I’ll address it here.

A Wrong Use of the Wrong Statistics

Pro-natalists claim that antinatalism is wrong since only a tiny minority of people feel that their lives are not worth living, evidently very few people carry out suicide. This claim is false from several aspects, first of all factually.
Officially, more than one million people worldwide kill themselves every year. That means that statistically, for every 130 people born each year, one will carry out suicide. Globally, suicide ranks among the three leading causes of death among those aged 15–44 years, and the 2nd leading cause of death in the world for those aged 15-24 years. In most countries the incidence of suicides is higher than the incidence of intentional homicides. In the United States there are more than twice as many suicides as there are homicides. A report by the World Health Organization states that more people take their own lives every year, than those murdered or killed in war.
According to recent findings from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, over the past 20 years, suicide rates have been on the rise in every state in the US except Nevada. The research found that the suicide rate increased by more than 30% in half of the states from 1999 to 2016. In some states, that increase was as high as 58%.
The World Health Organization states that a person carries out suicide somewhere in the world every 40 seconds.
And all these are official statistics, unofficially the numbers are even higher as many deaths are not considered suicides but as accidents or unsolved mystery and etc., to avoid the associated public shame, or family guilt.

However, the more important point is not what the real scale of suicide is, but is it the real scale for life evaluation. It is not. Suicide statistics don’t reflect the number of people who feel that their lives are not worth living. If anything, it is suicide attempts which are much more indicative, and the statistics are that there is one death by suicide for every 25 attempts. So all the former statistics, as alarming as they must be to anyone who thinks this pro-natalist claim is reasonable in the first place, must be multiplied by 25.

But even that extent is very partial and misleading since trying to carry out suicide is extremely difficult, and from many different aspects. The first and most primal one is that it is biologically difficult. Many people don’t carry out suicide because they are built to survive. As horrible as life is for someone, to intentionally end it by oneself, one must overpower the very strong biological instinct of self-preservation. Almost every biological mechanism in our body is built to survive, including the innate fear of pain, height, being under water, blood, suffocation and etc. and suicide often involves at least one of them.
People are biologically wired to survive, and that doesn’t change even when they are living in complete misery. We have evolved to survive, not to kill ourselves, so to try it anyway, one must overpower strong primal forces, and this is only the beginning of the suicide ordeal.

Another obstacle to overcome is a social one. The social status of suicide is that it is wrong, cowardly and even a sin. People are indoctrinated from age zero to believe that life is precious, a sacred gift one must cherish. Of course, one can wonder, if life was really a gift then why almost each and every society and religion feel the need to condemn suicide as sin, as a sign of weakness and ingratitude? Why do they all fight the suicide option and insist on forcing life on people instead of letting them decide if they want to use this “gift” or not? Why not making suicide legal and legitimate? Isn’t it suspicious that life is constantly praised and death constantly condemned? When so many people are making so much effort to prove something which is supposed to be so obvious, it means that it is not so obvious that it is so obvious.
However, having said that, it is not easy to overcome this intensive indoctrination. In addition to the inner constraints, the fact that a suicide attempt usually carries a social stigma deters many from trying. If the veil of social shame is removed, and if no religion institute considered it a sin (which is a very important factor to many people), clearly many more people would have carried out suicide.

Another obstacle is jurisdictional. It may sound relatively minor, however, in many places in the world, people are afraid that in the case of failing, they would be coercively hospitalized in a psychiatric hospital.
Another jurisdictionally important factor is that it is illegal to assist suicide. Many find it hard to kill themselves by themselves but would do it easily if they were assisted. It is not accidental that assisting another person to carry out suicide is a crime. If it wasn’t, probably many more people would use the assistance of others and do it.

Another serious obstacle to overcome is the fear of death. It may sound counterintuitive but it is not that people who consider suicide want to die, it’s that they don’t want to live. They can fantasize daily about ending their life and at the same time fear death and the unknown. The fear of death, even among the ones who wish for the ending of their lives, is instinctive, everyone is biologically built to fear death. And since not everyone view death as the end of all experiences, many are also conceptually afraid of it. Afraid of the unknown. In my view, death is not a state of unknown experiences, but of no experiences whatsoever, however the point here is not about how death feels like for the one who died (which is a morally irrelevant question as the dead don’t experience anything anymore including their own death), but how death feels like for the one who lives (which is a morally relevant question, since the living do have experiences regarding death as long as they are alive), and for many this experience is fear. And it is this fear of death, not the love of life, which prevents many people from killing themselves.

So, many people don’t carry out suicide because they are scared to die, and many don’t carry out suicide because they are scared not to die (if they fail). To fear a failed suicide attempt is also a very serious obstacle. Some people have survived jumping off high buildings, ending up in an even more horrible situation. Same goes for jumping off bridges, as in many cases their bodies have triggered survival instincts which made them try and swim up for air, until they were found by the coast guards. Some people survive overdoses if they haven’t swallowed the right pills or the right amount of them. Same goes for self-poisoning.
The fear of a severe disability or any other medical damage as a result of a suicide attempt, detains many who fear that they might end up even worse than they were.

Some people are halted by a personal obstacle in the form of obligations to others such as their children or other family members who are dependent on them. Many people reach the conclusion that their lives are not worth living after having children and so are trapped in life. This is, at least partly, why young people who don’t have children yet, and old people whom their children are old enough to take care of themselves, carry out suicide in much higher rates than people in the ages of 29 to 50.

Another major obstacle is guilt. Many people really want to end their life, but don’t want to hurt the people who care about them. People tend to blame themselves for the suicide of close ones, and people who contemplate suicide know that. They also know that people who carried out suicide are blamed for being selfish. And they don’t want that either.
Many are concerned that their close ones might find their body or that if they would make sure it would be hard to find their body, it would make people who care about them extremely worried until it would be found.

And finally, seemingly merely a technical obstacle but actually of the most important ones, is the lack of easy access to fast, safe and painless methods of suicide.
One of the reasons that men successfully carry out suicide about four times more often than women is gun ownership. Where methods which women usually prefer are available, for example ingestible lethal poisons in China and India, female suicide rates are similar and sometimes exceed that of men. That means that when people have access to a reliably lethal method, they are far more likely to kill themselves. Or in other words, if reliably lethal methods were more available, suicide rates were much higher.

In her book Night Falls Fast: Understanding Suicide, Kay Jamison lists some horrible suicide methods performed by people who didn’t have access to more convenient options:

“To kill themselves, the suicidal have jumped into volcanoes; starved themselves to death; thrust rumps of turkeys down their throats; swallowed dynamite, hot coals, underwear, or bed clothing; strangled themselves with their own hair; used electric drills to bore holes into their brains; walked off into the snow with no provisions and little clothing; placed their necks in vices; arranged for their own decapitation; and injected into themselves every substance known to man, including air, peanut butter, poison, mercury, and mayonnaise. They have flown bombers into mountains, applied black widow spiders to their skin, drowned in vats of beer or vinegar, and suffocated themselves in their refrigerators or hope chests. One of Karl Menninger’s patients tried repeatedly to kill himself by drinking raw hydrochloric acid; he survived those attempts and died only after swallowing lighted firecrackers.” (p.133)

This list goes to show that for many people their existence is so horrible that they preferred to go through these horrible ways of dying and not through life. And who knows how many people had to suffer horrible lives because they couldn’t put themselves through any of these horrible methods and didn’t have alternatives. Had they had any, the suicide rates were much higher. And that is the case today just as much. If the most convenient suicide methods, for example a drug overdose of soporifics, were highly available, many more would have killed themselves.

People often say that gun ownership increases the risk of suicide as firearms account for about half of all suicides in the United States. But clearly this data is presented falsely. Gun ownership doesn’t incite a will to die, but an easy way to actualize it. The will to die is incited by life.
This data shows that if everyone had a gun many people would have chosen to use it to end their own misery. And that is despite that killing oneself with a shot to the head is not a very inviting option. If there was a pill which anyone could purchase at any drugstore with no prescription, which painlessly and surely kills during sleep, the suicide rates would skyrocket.

This is a very partial list of the suicide ordeal. There are many more factors and there is definitely much more to say about each of the mentioned ones. But I guess it is sufficient for claiming that suicide is very difficult physically, mentally and emotionally. And yet, every year, tens of millions of people are trying to do it anyway. This fact, especially considering all these obstacles and many more, is a proof of how horrible life is, not the other way around.

But the even more important point for that matter is that all these obstacles, by preventing millions of people from trying to kill themselves, conceal the true number of people who feel that their lives are not worth living. Since trying to kill oneself is so difficult, it would be much more accurate to consider how many have thought about it. The question in point is not how many people have killed themselves, or how many have tried to, but how many wanted to.

Based on data from the 2017 National Survey on Drug Use and Health (NSDUH) by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), the prevalence of serious suicidal thoughts among adults aged 18-25 is 10.5%.
The CDC estimates that about 10 million American adults seriously contemplated ending their life, nearly 3 million made a suicide plan, and 1.3 million attempted suicide.

A comprehensive study of suicidal thinking among college students in the United States found that more than half of the 26,000 surveyed had suicidal thoughts at some point during their lifetime.
The web-based survey conducted in spring 2006 used separate samples of undergraduate and graduate students from 70 colleges and universities across the country. Of the 15,010 undergraduates, average age 22, 55 percent had ever thought of suicide; 18 percent seriously considered it; and 8 percent made an attempt. Among 11,441 graduate students, average age 30: Exactly half had such thoughts; 15 percent seriously considered it and 6 percent made an attempt.

A more recent and extensive study that surveyed more than 67,000 students in the United States, found that over 20 percent of the students had suicidal thoughts or attempts just in the passing year. Furthermore, 9 percent had attempted suicide, and nearly 20 percent have deliberately injured themselves.

A study among students in grades 9-12, also in United States, has found that 17% of students seriously considered attempting suicide in the previous year. 13.6% of students made a plan about how they would attempt suicide in the previous year. 8% of students attempted suicide one or more times in the previous year. And 2.7% of students made a suicide attempt that resulted in an injury, poisoning, or an overdose that required medical attention.

Other researches, conducted in Europe and Africa as well as in the United States, have shown that mild to severe thoughts of suicide are common, occurring in 20 to 65 percent of college students.

In the earlier mentioned book Night Falls Fast: Understanding Suicide various surveys regarding suicide are detailed. All of them are a bit dated (the book was published in 1999) but since the figures have only gone up since then, many are still relevant and insightful. Here are several of them:

“Twenty-five years ago, in an early community-based study of suicidal thinking and behaviors, University of Cambridge psychiatrist Gene Paykel and his colleagues interviewed more than 700 people in New Haven, Connecticut. The results gave a public face to what had been very private thoughts. More than 10 percent of those interviewed said that, at some point in their lives, they had felt that “life was not worth living,” and a comparable number said that they had, at one time or another, “wished they were dead.” One person in twenty had thought about actually taking his or her own life, and most of those who had thought about suicide had thought about it seriously. One person in a hundred said he or she had attempted suicide. Approximately twenty years ago, the National Institute of Mental Health began the largest study ever undertaken of the nature and extent of psychiatric disorders in the U.S. population. It involved extensive interviews of a total of 20,000 people living in the five American catchment areas of Baltimore, Maryland; Piedmont County, North Carolina; Los Angeles, California; New Haven, Connecticut; and St. Louis, Missouri. The study included four questions about suicide, similar to those asked by Paykel and his colleagues, but was more specific in that it required a minimal duration for suicidal thoughts of two weeks. Of the 18,500 individuals who responded to the questions about suicide, 11 percent said they had at some point during their lives felt so low they had thought of committing suicide; 3 percent of the total said they had made one or more suicide attempts. Other investigations conducted in general communities have found that, consistent with these two studies, between 5 and 15 percent of the general adult population acknowledge having had suicidal thoughts at some point in their lives.

Two other studies of American high school students confirmed that thinking about suicide is far from a rare concern: more than 50 percent of New York high school students reported that they had “thought about killing themselves,” and 20 percent of Oregon high school students described a history of suicidal thinking of varying degrees of severity.” (p.35)

Suicide statistics are much higher than pro-natalists want to believe, and they increase along the years. They are also only partial. We don’t need to examine the number of suicides or suicide attempts, but the number of people who seriously wanted to die, of people who contemplate suicide. And that is a very high percentage.
And even more important than how many people are currently contemplating suicide, is how many would have, had all the obstacles mentioned before been removed. Obviously it is impossible to estimate this figure, but if suicidal figures are at all necessary to constitute an antinatalist argument (a claim which I disagree with but go with it for the sake of the argument), this is the figure to work with.

Pro-natalists find it much easier to consider “only” suicides (and reduce even their true scope), and to ignore suicide attempts, and suicide thoughts. But the question is how many would rather not live, not how many can overcome every obstacle in the suicide ordeal. It is easier for them since they know that the answer to that question, the answer to the right one, doesn’t reinforce pro-natalism but exactly the opposite.

Many people don’t carry out suicide not because life is a gift, but because ending it is a serious burden and from many different aspects. If all the preventable obstacles were omitted, the relatively high rate of suicide, suicide attempts, and suicidal thoughts, would have been much much higher.
Not that it is necessary in order to constitute an antinatalist argument, as even if it was truly a tiny minority it would have been sufficient, but it is currently not a tiny minority, and there would be many more people who would carry out suicide hadn’t there been so many obstacles. This is the real figure. Not how many did, or how many tried, and not even how many thought about it, but how many would have thought about ending their lives had all the obstacles been removed. Then we would have had a more accurate reflection of how horrible life is. Not a precious gift but a monstrous burden which is very difficult to get rid of.

Cruel Trap

The third pro-natalist use of suicide – that the option to kill oneself is always available for anyone who has ‘a problem with life’– was actually already proven false in the former part of this text. Every obstacle mentioned, and others that weren’t, don’t only prove that the current suicide scale is not at all indicative of the number of people whom their lives are not worth living, it also proves that suicide is not really an option for people who feel that way.

Even people who really suffer in life are usually afraid of death, of pain, of permanently disabling themselves if they don’t succeed, of committing a sin, of their family, of the unknown, of breaking the law, of being socially shamed, of being blamed for selfishness, of the isolation ward in a psychiatric hospital. So the suicide option is not very tempting in the better case, and nonviable in the worst.

For suicide to really be an option societies must adopt a right to die, with no committees, no investigations, and no forms to fill besides a formal application, and with assistance to anyone who wishes to die. Not only that suicide must be legal, it should be easy, highly accessible, painless, cheap and risk free. And even all that, which is currently exactly the opposite of the way society view suicide, is far from being enough to argue that anyone who thinks life is not worth living can simply carry out suicide.

It is false from every perspective to present suicide as a legitimate option available to anyone at any time. Biologically, suicide is the last option. And the fact that people are biologically built to survive, doesn’t soothe individuals whose lives are not worth living in their eyes, but exactly the opposite. They are prisoners of their own biological mechanisms. They are life’s captives, not free spirits who can choose to end their lives whenever and however they wish. People are trapped in horrible lives without a truly viable option to end it. They are built to stay even though their lives are bad.
People have no serious exit option that can justify their forced entry. Not that if there was any, procreation was morally justifiable, but at least this argument was decent and coherent. But there isn’t so it is not. People must overcome too many obstacles with each being too difficult, for suicide to really be an option.

It is very easy for pro-natalists to “solve” the issue by suggesting the suicide option, but it is not as if suicide is really perceived socially as a legitimate option. In fact it is exactly the opposite.
Suicide is perceived as an irrational choice, if not as a psychological indication of insanity (under harsher medical regulations), and never as a rational option anyone can choose, as it is falsely presented in this argument.

The fact that assisting suicide is illegal, and that the most convenient suicide methods are illegal and very inaccessible, also testify as to how far suicide is from being a legitimate option for people who want to end their lives.

If the ‘suicide is always an option’ justification for forcing life without consent was genuine, its advocators would also be advocators of making suicide more accessible, acceptable and easier. But they don’t, since obviously it is not genuine but merely a lame and lazy excuse for their selfish desire to procreate.

Most parents deceive and excuse themselves by saying that it won’t happen to their children. But it does. This claim implies that all the parents of all the people who have carried out suicide did a bad job as parents, which of course is not necessarily true. Many things are not under the control of parents (for example, there is not a lot that parents can do about mental diseases, or deep depression, which in many cases lead to suicide). The parents of people who have carried out suicide or a suicide attempt, are not necessarily worse than any other parent and they haven’t necessarily done something wrong as parents. They have definitely done something very wrong as people, which is creating persons who want to kill themselves, but this is not necessarily a result of them being worse parents than any other parent, since it can happen to anyone, and therefore no one should procreate.
No one should take the risk that their children would suffer so much that they would not only want to die, but that they would overcome all the obstacles and try to do something about it, or won’t because they are too afraid, or because they care too much about the people who care about them.
No one should put anyone in such a horrible position where they don’t want to live but are trapped in life.

Tens of millions of people are forced to live day after day after day, feeling that they don’t want to live, but are afraid of carrying out suicide, or that they are even in a deeper trap, can’t stand living but can’t stand the thought of hurting others by killing themselves. This is the cruel trap many people are forced to endure because they were brought to life. The option of suicide is not a legitimate solution for the problem of procreation, but in fact another of its many evils. Suicide is not a viable solution, and even if it was, it cannot compensate anyone for the suffering of existence, but can only stop the continuance of the suffering of existence. It can’t retroactively justify the existence of someone who doesn’t want to live, or wishes s/he had never existed. The suffering of these people can never be compensated nor justified, even if suicide was fast, fearless, absolutely sure, plain, painless and harmless to others. And it is definitely not the case when it is none of the above. Suicide is always difficult and rarely unharmful to people who knew the person carrying it out.

To seriously suggest the suicide option as if it is plain, harmless and viable for anyone, is not naïve, but stupid, ignorant and cruel.

Since so many people are so deterred by the thought of hurting so severely people who care about them, and so are trapped in life, if it was possible to carry out suicide by pressing a button that immediately totally erases the existence of these people, so that no one who ever knew them even remember their existence, then suicide could have been suggested more seriously as an option. But if this option was viable the number of suicides was enormous.
The reasons why not many more people are carrying out suicides is not that life is a gift but because of biological, psychological, emotional and even juridical difficulties.

Not only that hundreds of millions of people were forced to live lives they don’t want, and without their consent, they are forced to keep living them because they don’t want or are afraid to kill themselves for any of the mentioned reasons.

Trapping people in the impossible situation of not wanting to live but not wanting to kill themselves, for example, so not to hurt others, is not a solution, but an additional problem of procreation. It is a very cruel trap which the only way to avoid it is by not creating more persons.
However, people are ready to take the risk that their own children would end up in this cruel trap rather than giving up procreation. This is how cruel most people are. And that’s why it is pointless to show them the cruel trap they are creating for their own children, hoping they would choose to avoid it, and why it is so essential to try and break these cruel traps ourselves.


References

American Foundation for Suicide Prevention www.afsp.org

Cabrera Julio, A Critique of Affirmative Morality: a reflection on death, birth and the value of life
(Brasília: Julio Cabrera Editions 2014)

Cabrera Julio, Negative-Ethics 2011
https://philosopherjuliocabrera.blogspot.com/2011/05/negative-ethics.html

Cavan Shonle Ruth The Wish Never To Have Been Born (American Journal of Sociology Volume 37, 1932)

David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Jamison, Kay R, Night Falls Fast, Understanding Suicide (Vintage 2000)

Kann L, Kinchen S, Shanklin SL, et al. Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance — United States, 2013. MMWR 2014; 63(ss04): 1-168. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6304a1.htm

Nature of Suicidal Crises in College Students http://www.cmhc.utexas.edu/rc_project5.html

Parks SE, Johnson LL, McDaniel DD, Gladden M. Surveillance for Violent Deaths– National Violent Death Reporting System, 16 states, 2010. MMWR 2014; 63(ss01): 1-33. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss6301a1.htm

Sarah Perry Every Cradle Is a Grave: Rethinking the Ethics of Birth and Suicide
(Nine-Banded Books 2014)

Silverman, M., Meyer, P., Sloane, F., Raffel, M., & Pratt, D. (1997). The Big Ten student suicide study. Suicide and Life Threatening Behavior, 27, 285–303
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1943–278X.1997.tb00411.x/abstract

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Results from the 2013 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Mental Health Findings, NSDUH Series H-49, HHS Publication No. (SMA) 14-4887. Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services, 2014. Available at http://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHmhfr2013/NSDUHmhfr2013.pdf

Sullivan EM, Annest JL, Luo F, Simon TR, Dahlberg LL. Suicide Among Adults Aged 35-36 Years – United States, 1999-2010. MMWR 2013; 62(17): 321-325. Available from http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6217a1.htm

Suicide Prevention Resource Center www.sprc.org

https://www.sprc.org/sites/default/files/Handout-DataAboutSuicidalBehaviorAmongCollegeandUniversityStudents.pdf

https://www.webmd.com/depression/news/20180910/1-in-5-college-students-stressed-consider-suicide

http://www.vhemt.org/suicide.htm

https://www.save.org/about-suicide/suicide-facts

Web-based Injury Statistics Query and Reporting System (WISQARS) [Online]. (2013, 2011) National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, CDC (producer). Available from http://www.cdc.gov/injury/wisqars/index.html

The Risk Argument

One of the strongest antinatalist arguments is the risk argument. Its power is that even if many people are glad that they were forced into existence (leave aside all the problems involved in such a claim), not every person feels that way, in fact many don’t, and no prospective parents can ever tell if the person they are creating would feel that way. No matter how hard the parents would try to make sure that their children would be happy, there are infinite ways in which life can easily turn from happy to miserable, with very little, and sometimes nothing, that the parents can do about it or control. The risk argument doesn’t necessitate thinking that life is inherently bad, but that a bad life is always a possibility. Even people who generally think that life is good, agree that existence is dangerous. There is always a risk that a person would endure extremely miserable life, and one shouldn’t take risks on another’s life.

There is no one who doesn’t suffer in life, and there are very few who are happy. People have a choice whether or not to create a sentient creature who would necessarily suffer and they choose to do so. They choose for someone to experience pain, to die, to fear death, to be frustrated, to get sick, to be broken hearted, to be offended, to be rejected, to be disappointed and etc. Pleasurable experiences might also occur, but not necessarily, and the negative ones will definitely happen in everyone’s life.
Pleasures are optional, happiness almost never is, pain is inevitable, and extreme suffering is very probable, at least during some parts of life. Why force someone into this condition?

How exactly could the parents of a suffering person justify their decision if they are confronted with their child? “We had a really good feeling that you’d be really happy”?!

Studies have shown that people’s personal optimism – the tendency to rate the relative likelihood that various positive and negative events would happen to them, as opposed to being likely to happen to the average person of their same age, sex, and surroundings – is more pronounced with regard to bad events than good events. People underestimate the chances of something bad happening to them, more strongly than they overestimate the chances of something good happening to them. In other words, they think that bad things are more likely to happen to other people, and good things are more likely to happen to them. This false bias is at its extreme ethical fallacious when it comes to procreation since people are underestimating the chances of something bad happening to their children. Most people’s reaction to horrors happening to their children is shock, but bad things happen to someone, and to someone’s parents. It shouldn’t be so shocking that something bad happens to their children, in fact, it is very probable that bad things, with different degrees of severity, would happen to everyone.
Even more than people’s personal optimism, the problem is that most people are not even considering the possibility of harms to their children, if they even think about the interests of their future children and not merely their own.

Nothing would be lost if a person won’t be created, however there is a potential for a very serious loss if the created person would be miserable.
Every time people decide to have a child, they are creating somebody who can suffer immensely. The only way to absolutely guarantee that a person won’t suffer is not to create it.

David Benatar’s antinatalism is not risk based, however he does write about a principle of caution, combined with his asymmetry:

“Followers of this principle recognize that nobody suffers if one mistakenly presumes a preference not to have been born, but people do suffer if one mistakenly presumes a preference to have been born. Imagine that one presumes that a fetus will develop into somebody who will be glad to have been born. One therefore does not abort the fetus. If one’s presumption was mistaken, and this fetus develops into somebody who was not glad to have been born, then there is somebody who suffers (for a lifetime) from one’s having made the wrong presumption. Imagine now that one makes the opposite presumption—that the fetus will develop into somebody who will not be glad to have been born. Therefore one aborts that fetus. If this presumption was mistaken, and this fetus would have developed into somebody who would have been glad to have been born, there will be nobody who suffers from the mistaken presumption.” (Benatar 2006 p.153)

Of course, many antinatalists object Benatar’s asymmetry, however, since existence necessarily means suffering but not necessarily happiness, we can say in that context and under this formulation, that there is an asymmetry derived from probability. Suffering is mandatory no matter who would be born, and happiness is optional and circumstance-dependent. During a lifetime, a person might experience greater pleasures than harms, but harms are inevitable while pleasures are optional.
As opposed to Benatar’s asymmetry argument whereby it is always better never to have been, according to a risk based asymmetry argument, even if it is not the case that it is always better never to have been, certainly at least some people would regret being forced into existence, however, undoubtedly, no person would ever regret not being forced into existence. Even if it is not always better never to have been, it is most certainly always better never to procreate, since there is always an option for a miserable life, at all stages of life, and to various degrees. No one can ever ensure that the person they are creating wouldn’t be miserable. No one can tell the outcome, and no one should gamble on the life of another.

There is a very realistic probability that a person forced into existence would be miserable. There is not even a theoretical possibility that a person forced into existence won’t be harmed at all. Creating someone who would definitely be harmed and the only variable is to what extent (and with the potential of extreme misery), must be morally prohibited. Given that the motives are never the interests of the to-be born person, it is not only morally flawed, it is selfish, egocentric, arrogant and careless.

Absolute Certainty

Though creating someone is a risk taken at that person expense, and it is truly a gamble on someone else’s life, in terms of general harm, procreation is not at all a gamble or risk, but absolute certainty. Creating a person is not taking a risk that harms would be inflicted, since it is absolutely certain that the person created would severely harm others. Even if the person created would have a great life which s/he is glad to have, it is absolutely certain that serious harms would be inflicted by that person.

When creating a new person, people take a risk that this person would have given consent to be harmed if it was possible, and that this person would feel that the pleasures outweigh the harms, but it is not a gamble that this person would cause a lot of harms to many others, it is a fact. Procreation is not taking a risk of causing harms, it is indifferently deciding to cause harms.

Many pro-natalists argue that although the worst outcomes of existence are awful, it is permissible to risk them happening if their probability is sufficiently low. I totally disagree that the probability of awful outcomes is sufficiently low, and even more than that I disagree that it is therefore permissible to risk someone else’s life. But even if we’ll put that aside for the sake of the argument, considering the harm to others, the probability of the worst outcomes of existence is not only not sufficiently low, it is absolutely certain.

The possibility of creating even one extremely miserable person is enough to make procreation unethical. The fact that it is estimated that there are tens of millions of suicidal people around the world makes procreation unethical and really cruel. And the fact that there are trillions of victims of humanity’s procreation makes the opposition to forced sterilization unethical and really cruel.


References

Benatar, David. Better Never to Have Been (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Shiffrin, Seana. Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm Legal Theory 5, no. 2 (1999): 117–48

The Most Positive Ethics

The philosopher Julio Cabrera which I have mentioned and quoted in the text regarding David Benatar’s asymmetry argument, is unfortunately a much less known antinatalist thinker.
This text is mainly based on his outstanding book A Critique of Affirmative Morality.
Despite some challenging and more technical parts (mainly regarding phenomenology which are not crucial for understanding the antinatalist arguments in my view) I highly recommend everyone to read it.
And if you choose not to, I recommend to at least read Cabrera’s 15 Steps Towards Negative Ethics. You can find them at the end of this text.

A Critique of Affirmative Morality

Cabrera’s quite unique antinatalism outlook is derived from an even more unique ethical theory called Negative Ethics. He uses the word negative not only in the sense of value, arguing that life has a negative one since it inevitably contains pain, illness, aging, decay, compromises, frustration, fragility, and death, but also as an opposite to what he calls Affirmative Morality.
Here is a brief explanation in his words:

“The non-critical acceptation of fundamental theses of the type “the being is good”, “to be is better than not to be”, “the more being, the better”, etc, as well as the conviction that the ethical theory should ask directly about how-to be, how-to live, how to conduct an “ethical life”, and never ask if life itself is ethical, if there is not an ethical cost in simply staying alive, in “living a life” as if the being was, so to speak, “granted” and immunized against criticism. The ethicity of being, of living, of emerging to life, of being born, is given, in affirmative thinking – in my sense – as a granted and never thematically exposed conviction, as something already positively valued.” (p.131)

The various affirmative morality systems suggest various sets of rules for everyday life (“intra-worldly” in Cabrera’s lingo) since according to them existence itself is not even questioned.
Therefore, Cabrera argues that all the affirmative morality systems can offer is what he calls secondary morality. And that is in the more charitable case, in the much less charitable one he thinks that they are partner in crime, since the secondary ethics, by seeking for the “good life”, conceal the need of asking whether it is good to live, and can we be good while living. His answers are no and no. Although he shares the common antinatalist view that life has a negative value, his antinatalism doesn’t stem from the low chance of having a good life, but from the sure chance of harming and manipulating others, and the sure chance of mortality. He removes the element of whether pain and pleasure are in balance overall and argues that it’s the very structure of life itself that is the problem. Hence he thinks that all affirmative morality systems are hypocritical since they ignore and conceal the indispensable violation of the interests of others just by being alive, and of the self by the indispensable fact of mortality.

Mortality

Benatar mentions the harm of death as a reason not to create a new person, but in his case it is a side point that he adds to one of his central arguments. He claims that the fact that people must die is another harm they are forced to endure by coming into existence. For Cabrera death is not a side point or just another antinatalist argument but one of the main ones. When Cabrera talks about death he is not referring to the fact that at some point a person would die (what he calls a “punctual death”), but to the fact that at the point of birth a person starts dying (what he calls a “structural death” or “mortality”). Mortality is not identical to death, but to birth. To be born is to be forced with mortality.

Many people mix the two and say that if death is considered bad, it is because “life” is good. But that claim can be relevant only to punctual death, and not to structural death, since if life is structurally composed of its own elimination it cannot be good. From structural death perspective, if mortality is bad, then the life that inherently carries it must be bad as well. So, saying that life is good and that it’s a shame they must end, is totally ignoring the fact that life and death are intertwined.

In Cabrera’s words, taken from the article Negative Ethics:

“A better way is to consider the value of human life structurally, also considering SD [structural death], the mortality of being, and not just PD [punctual death]. If we use this other dimension of death, it could not have any sense to say that “life is good, but dying is bad”, nor the opposite, that “life is bad, and therefore death is good”, given that, structurally seen, death is inside living, inseparable from it; living is internally mortal, mortality has emerged along with the being itself, it is the very being of being. Ultimately, life is identical to SD.
Regretting having to die should be structurally identical to regretting being born, because it is not in our power being born in a non-mortal way.”

Besides structural death, he also talks about structural pain, which is mainly the pain of decay, aging and illness. And just like structural death, these are also inevitable parts of being. Cabrera argues that the suffering relevant to procreation is beyond contingent pains that may or may not be balanced with pleasures, it is the structural pain given at birth, the pain of declining, suffering and dying, which are inescapable and independent of the content of a specific human life.

The Harm to Others

For Cabrera, ethics is fundamentally a matter of otherness, therefore the main ethical question is what one should do with other peoples’ lives. According to him, the basics are not to harm and not to manipulate others (he calls it fundamental ethical articulation or FEA). However, according to Cabrera it is simply impossible:

“once (being) appeared it expands, crawls, covers the greatest area, gets space, invades, offends, disturbs, eliminates. Being seems to successively transgress an ontological law in its mere establishment and an ethical law in its intention to stay forever and to continue in any way. The abandon of non-being stains and disappoints; on the other hand, being disturbs, gets in conflict, expands and makes noise.” (p.34)

The others are not only harmed and limited by the birth of a person, but also harm and limit the newborn because the others are a fundamental part of the limitation and narrowness of one’s existence, who is born without place, and in the places that that person wants to live there are already others.

One cannot avoid getting in conflict with the others because it is impossible to really cease any communication with others. Every action people do affects others. So it is structurally impossible to fulfil the most basic ethical requirements. That’s why Cabrera thinks that life itself is unethical, humans are morally disqualified, and affirmative morality systems, which essentially compromise on these structural harms, are inevitably compelled to use hypocrisy to hide inherent transgression.

By assuming a first degree morality, Cabrera argues that: “facing the other, I in principle can (and maybe ought to) disappear, desisting of the space we both incompatibly intend to occupy. My departure from the world is, therefore, marked by the presence of the other.” (p.82)
But Cabrera is well aware of the impracticability of this claim, since humans have a naturally built-in self-preference feature:

“by simply being, two fundamental things have occurred: (a) we have self-limited ourselves in comparison to the level of pure possibilities, (b) we have radically exposed ourselves to the risk of moral disqualification by constructing ourselves as necessarily in conflict against-the-others in favor to ourselves. But also a third thing occurs: (c) by simply being, we are, inevitably, someone. To be is always to be someone, to be a non-other, the negation of the other in our own being, not by being this or that, but simply because the others are someone who is not me and who I could never be.” (p.91)

The structural violation of others’ interests, resulted from the very existence of a person, is very central in Cabrera’s theory, but he is also concerned with the structural violation of a person’s interests resulted from its own very existence:

“1) Human beings are born as sufferers, by being thrown from the mother’s inward to the limitation of being in its instauration.
2) Human beings are regularly affected, already in mother’s inward and during their whole existence, by the threat of countless diseases. Health condition can be seen as a highly unstable balance.
3) Human beings are affected, in general, by a fundamental fragility, which concerns the constitution of their organs, their brains, etc.
4) Human beings are affected, in general, by the conflict among natural beings, threatened by other natural beings and obliged to threat other natural beings (which constitutes a kind of anti-Spinozian geometrical ontology).” (p.146)

Obsessively optimists often argue that: “After the bad moments, come the good ones”, and that “Tomorrow will be another day”. But Cabrera replies that: “This symmetry of possibilities finishes in the structural level, because tomorrow will absolutely not be another day but the same day as yesterday, and the same as the day before yesterday and the same as always.”

In the article Negative Ethics Cabrera argues that:

“life is bad in the double register of the sensible – for generating suffering – and moral – for generating disregard for others. ‘Moral impediment’ is precisely the phenomenon that an intrinsically mortal being is not in a position to be considered with others, in the sense demanded by the FEA; because he/she is forced to make his/her way in a difficult, short and aggressive life, where others are always in a second place, not for “selfishness” or “evil nature” of humans, but for sheer survival.”

As counter intuitive as it may seem, the above description is rather flattering for humanity. I wish people were harming others only for survival reasons. Reality is unfortunately much crueler. People harm, exploit, torture, humiliate, deprive, attack, ignore, abuse and whatnot, for much less supreme reasons. His argument is true regarding other animals, most don’t harm others if it is not necessary for their survival, but this is far from being the case when it comes to humans. They often harm out of selfish reasons. I agree with Cabrera that humans are compelled to harm others by the very structure of the world. But I disagree that it explains all of humanity’s harms and I extremely disagree that all of it is for sheer survival. Humans are not selfish because they are mortal. They don’t harm others because they have things they need, but because they have things they want.

Antinatalist Claims

Before I address Cabrera’s ethical alternative, I would like to quote some of the antinatalist claims he makes along the book. Not because I think you’ll find the former arguments insufficient to necessarily pave the way for Antinatalism, but because many of them are independently worth reading.
Here are some representative samples taken from his article Negative Ethics:

“To come into being is to be ontologically impoverished, sensibly affected and ethically blocked: to be alive is a fight against everything and everybody, trying all the time to escape from suffering, failure and injustice. This strongly suggests that the true reason for making someone to come into being is never for the person’s own sake, but always for the interest of his/her progenitors, in a clear attitude of manipulation; radical manipulation indeed because, in contrast with usual manipulation of people already alive, manipulation in procreation affects the very being of the person, and not only some of his/her predicates.”

“Procreation is morally problematic in the strict measure that we know perfectly well, before birth, that all these natural and social sufferings will inevitably happen to our sons or daughters, even when we do not know if they will like to study English or live in Brazil or eat chocolates or play chess.”

And some representative samples taken from his book:

“Even we do not know, for example, whether they will enjoy traveling, working or studying classical languages, we do know they will be indigent, decadent, vacating beings who will start dying since birth, who will face and be characterized by systematic dysfunctions, who will have to constitute their own beings as beings-against-the-others – in the sense of dealing with aggressiveness and having to discharge it over others – who will lose those they love and be lost by those who love them, and time will take everything they manage to build, etc.” (p.54)

“It would not mitigate anything of our moral procreation onus the fact that we suppose the newborn will have a sufficiently strong structure to bear the non-being of being, in a similar way we undoubtedly would not morally justify the behavior of someone who sent a colleague to a dangerous situation by saying: “I sent him there because I know he is strong and he will manage well”. The “strengths” of the newborn do not relieve in anything the moral responsibility of the procreator. Anyone would answer: “This is irrelevant. Your role in the matter consisted of sending people to a situation you know was difficult and painful and you could avoid it. Your predictions about their reacting manners do not decrease in anything your responsibility.
In the case of procreation, the reasoning could be the same, and in a notorious emphatic way, since in any intra-worldly situation with already existing people in which we send someone to a position known as painful, the other one could always run away from pain to the extent his being is already in the world and he could predict danger and try to avoid being exposed to a disregarding and manipulative maneuver. In the case of the one who is being born, by contrast, this is not possible at all because it is precisely his very being that is being manufactured and used. Concerning birth, therefore, manipulation seems to be total.” (p.54)

“It looks like people are disposed to do all sort of things to avoid their children suffer, anything except… not bringing him or her to the structural pain and to moral disqualification.” (p.56)

“Even though the ontological manipulation of newborn is absolutely inevitable, it is evitable, for sure, to give birth, and that precisely indicates to a morality of abstention, to the extent this form of non-being seems to constitute a feasible way to free someone from structural pain and its consequent moral disqualification.” (p.55)


Non-Affirmative Morality (A short Survival Handbook)

After presenting his negative ethics theory, Cabrera returns to the ethical issue of how we should live. He uses the term survival, since it is not optional to simply live and thereby affirmatively experiencing the world. Instead, he suggests what he calls Negative Minimalism, meaning conducting life which is ontologically minimal, radically responsible, sober, and completely aware that it is only a secondary morality.

“The “survivor” sees himself basically as someone who has systematically refused himself to non-being, from ever structurally viable. He is not simply someone who lives more or less “naturally”, but someone who has not taken risks and survives within this refusing, with all its logical and ethical significance. Therefore, his living is not like most lives, inert and automatic, but a continuing full of sense and questioning. His continuing is something explicit and self-defining, a refusing that fills and characterizes all his effective existence.” (p.151)

Counter intuitively, there is something forcible in negative survival. When the entire system is so structurally harmful and flawed, only the strong can even consider negative survival. There is something violent in minimalism, since it is forsaking the helpless creatures of the world who have no way of defending themselves. If even the few people who care about others and are aware of how structurally violent and immoral this world is, won’t do everything in their power to help them, and instead would lead highly introversive lives, trillions of creatures would continue to be sentenced to life of severe misery.

The only way to justify the harms of our existence is by deep obligation to help others. And even that can’t compensate our victims. But at least it would prevent the victimization of trillions of others.
The best way to deal with a horrible world is not to shake oneself free of it, but to act so everybody is free. Internalizing that existence is so harmful and that lives are structurally immoral shouldn’t derive the ethical conclusion that we ought to negatively minimally survive in this horrible world, but to positively maximally influence it.

The conclusion of negative ethics should be negative existence. If there is no option for ethical existence there should be no procreation.
Being aware of the secondary ethics is a secondary solution. Moral people mustn’t make do with their private minimal existence, while others are suffering. We must make sure that no one is suffering. Or at least no one of the ones we can help. And these are all the creatures who suffer at the tyrant hands of the human race. It is not enough to claim that non-existence is better than existence, we must act so there would be no procreation. Therefore what moral people should aspire for is not a negative survival but a positive end of procreation of the uncomparably cruelest species ever.

Like Benatar Cabrera isn’t deterred by the idea of human extinction:

“Faced the allegation that, if this was universalized mankind would be extinguished, we shall answer that what we are trying to elucidate here is the ultimate ground of an ethical responsible life, not the conditions of indefinite keeping alive, not even in terms of the species as a whole. So perhaps survival at any cost may be incompatible – why not? – to the exercising of morality.” (p.161)

However, disappointedly he doesn’t present it as a legitimate negative ethics option:

“Of course, the extinction of humankind is not, by force, part of a program of negative survival; but certainly, survival at any cost could never be either.” (p.161)

But thinking that something is morally right should commit and impel us to act in its direction, not to survive in spite of it. Extinction should be part of a program of negative ethics. Suggesting to live minimally trying to prevent causing harms to others, is not enough, because it doesn’t prevent others from causing harms. I agree with Cabrera’s description of life on almost every point, but I disagree with his conclusion. In light of everything he wrote all along the book, the conclusion can’t be that people, who are already from the most privileged species on earth, and all the more so people who can permit themselves with deep reflections over philosophical issues, would seclude themselves and live with minimum intervention with the lives of others. A much more reasonable and ethical conclusion should be to maximally intervene in the lives of others, at least when it comes to procreation.
I call everyone who cares about others’ suffering, who understands the principles of negative ethics and antinatalism, not to concentrate on their own little lives while entrusting the fate of other suffering creatures in the hands of pro-natalists, but act so there would be no procreation anymore. The solution is not minimalism but maximalism. With minimalism you might reach personal tranquility and a sense of moral purity, but with maximalism we might bring trillions of sentient creatures to tranquility. Minimalism may sound better but is actually egocentric, maximalism may sound bad but is actually the most empathic and ethical option.

Appendix – Steps Towards Negative Ethics

  1. Throughout the history (of philosophy and of humankind) an intrinsic positive value has been given to human life. Because human life has this intrinsic positive value, procreating is good (or more: it is the most sacred and sublime moral value) and committing suicide is bad (or more: it is the worst, the greatest moral sin).
  2. With intrinsic value I mean: whether life has a metaphysical value (as in Christianity) or it has a practical value (as in Kant’s ethics); in any case, there is a basic value, which makes human life inviolable. Ethics, in this tradition, is understood as an activity aiming to determine how-to-live a life ultimately guided by that supreme, basic value, intrinsic to human life.
  3. Negative ethics starts with a negative ontology that presents life as having an intrinsic value, but negative. Therefore, it primarily denies Agnosticism, the idea that in life there is good and bad things, and that neither a positive nor a negative value can be derived. Nevertheless, it is the very being of life that is bad, not in the sense of a metaphysical evil, but in the sense of a sensitive and moral uneasiness.
  4. The very being of human life is a terminal structure that starts to end from the beginning, and that causes uneasiness in the sensitive level, through the phenomena of pain and boredom, and in the moral level, through the phenomena of moral disqualification. We are thrown into a body always subjected to disease, in fast process of aging, decline and final decomposition, in obligatory neighborhood with others in the same situation, what leaves little space for mutual moral consideration.
  5. Positive values do exist, but they are all of the order of beings (and not of the order of Being) and they are all of a vindictive character, or reactive to the structural uneasiness of Being; moreover, they pay high ontological prices (when a value is created, new disvalues are also, new conditions for non-consideration to other people). Positive values are thus, inevitably intra-worldly, reactive and onerous.
  6. Ethical theories have regularly supposed that it is possible to live an ethical life. Negative ethics states that an ethical life is possible only in the level of intra-worldly ethical values, reactive and onerous, within the structural uneasiness. Negative ontology (which is a naturalized ontology, to the extent that the characteristics of being are basically those of nature) replaces, therefore, the rationalist affirmative ontology of tradition, in the light of which all European ethical theories we know were built.
  7. Specifically, attending particular ethical theories, humans are unable of being virtuous (Aristotle), or of observing the categorical imperative (Kant) or of fighting for the happiness of the majority (Mill); when we face the whole context, we are aware of not being ethical in the terms of any of those theories. To avoid having to go into the nuances of each ethical theory, we can understand that all of them demand, at least, the consideration of other people’s interests, the non-manipulation and the non-damage (we call this FEA, fundamental ethical articulation). Negative ethics shows that people regularly violate FEA, what is called moral disqualification.
  8. In this level, negative ethics simply shows that, when the usual and current affirmative categories are seriously taken into consideration, the result is that all human actions are morally disqualified at some point, in some respect, at some moment or situation of its performance or compliance. This is important because it is not the case that “negative” categories lead to these results, but affirmative ones, when radicalized, do the job. This suggests that all European ethical theories we know perform an internal differentiation within general moral disqualification, declaring to be “moral” some disqualified actions, and disqualifying others in a sort of second order disqualification.
  9. But why do we have the strong impression that ethics exists and that we can be moral agents? When ethics talk about happiness, virtue or duty, when they accept the difference between good and bad people, they are concealing the structural disvalue of the being of human life as such, forgetting the intra-wordly, reactive and onerous character of positive values. Actually, we are all morally disqualified; disrespectful people do not constitute a small group of exceptions. All ethical theories that we know are “second degree ethics”, concealing, through all sort of mechanisms, the structural disvalue of human life, the moral disqualification and the situated and partial character of all positive value. (The usual ethics are built within the framework of a radical ethical impossibility).
  10. The fundamental deforming factor in ethics is the persistent belief that life is something good, that some people are good because they follow the norm of life, and other (few, exceptional) are bad for transgressing it; without seeing that goodness is built inside a fundamental evil, in a concealing and never gratuitous way (paying prices). The impossibility of ethics is hidden in everyday life, and also in the prevailing affirmative philosophical thinking, guided by the ideas of the positive value of life and of the exceptional nature of “evil”.
  11. As a corollary of this new view of things, procreation can be seen as an act morally problematic and, in many cases, simply irresponsible, since it consists in putting a being into existence knowing he or she will be placed in a terminal situation (in a terminal body), in constant friction and corruptible (sensitively and morally) structure, where the positive values will always be reactive and will pay high ethical and sensitive prices. Even the ontically responsible procreations are morally problematic, because the most one can offer to children is the capability of defending themselves against the terminal structure of being, in a scope of necessary disrespect of others in some degree. Besides giving them a structural disvalue, this is done in self benefit and in a clear exercise of manipulation of the other, using him or her as a means.
  12. Another important corollary is that suicide, far from being, in this perspective, the more horrible moral sin, it turns into an act that has better chances of being moral than many others, to the extent it empties the spaces of struggle against other people. Even though it may also damages, it does so not differently than the rest of human acts; the suicidal act is as reactive and onerous as the other acts, and maybe less (since it is about a sort of self-sacrifice, of stopping to defend oneself with no restrictions); and it is, certainly, the last disrespectful act. After all, we can cause more damage staying than we do leaving. (In any case from the sole disvalue of being of human life does not emerge suicide as a necessity, but merely as a possibility: each one of us will have to decide whether to continue or not struggling against the disvalue of being until our final defeat).
  13. Pain, boredom and moral disqualification are permanent and structural motives for abstaining of procreating and for suicide, independent from specific motivations.
  14. The disvalue of the very being of human life is what cannot be accepted or assumed; something that will be currently concealed until the end, because the basic value of human life is seen as what sustains all the rest. Life continues due to a powerful vital impulse, immoral and irrational. The arguments do not affect this value; it overruns all arguments, even the better ones. Humans stay alive and procreating not because life is intrinsically valuable, but because they are compelled to live even in the worst conditions. It is a mere “value of adhesion” (with something as a “value of resistance”, of competitive nature). Etwas Animalisches.
  15. Philosophers and people in general should understand that what they call “value of human life” is not value of human life in its being, but they are pointing to the values which humans are compelled to create precisely because life, in its being, is not good. (We do not need to give value to something already valuable). Our defensive and vindicatory actions try to make life something good (or at least tolerable), and these actions are confused with the being of life itself. Human life is, in any case, a conjunction of structural disvalue and positive intra-worldly invented values. And the persistent tendency is to take the seconds as if they were refutations of the first. (I call this the “fallacy of the way back”). But the existence of positive values is not the refutation of the disvalue of the being of life, but, on the contrary, its powerful confirmation: the worse are the rigors of being the more intense and dazzling are valuing intra-worldly inventions.” (p.236-240)
References

Cabrera Julio, A Critique of Affirmative Morality: a reflection on death, birth and the value of life
(Brasília: Julio Cabrera Editions 2014)

Cabrera Julio, Negative-Ethics 2011
https://philosopherjuliocabrera.blogspot.com/2011/05/negative-ethics.html

David Benatar, Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Critical Review of “Better Never To Have Been – Part 6 – Extinction and Pro-Mortalism

After addressing the asymmetry argument, and its supporting asymmetries, the quality-of-life argument, and Benatar’s ‘Pro-Death’ view for abortion, the last post regarding Better Never To Have Been, deals with its sixth chapter. It is mostly about extinction, on which Benatar says:
“My answer to the question ‘How many people should there be?’ is ‘zero’. That is to say, I do not think that there should ever have been any people. Given that there have been people, I do not think that there should be any more. But this ‘zero’ answer, I said earlier, is an ideal answer.” (p. 182)
And: “it would be better if humans (and other species) became extinct. All things being equal, my arguments also suggest that it would be better if this occurred sooner rather than later.”

So far so good, however Benatar divides extinction into two categories:

“It would be helpful to distinguish between two ways in which a species can become extinct. The first is for it to be killed off. The second is for it to die off. We might call the first ‘killing-extinction’ and the second either ‘dying-extinction’ or ‘non-generative extinction’. When a species is killed off, extinction is brought about by killing members of the species until there are no more of them. This killing may be by humans or it may be by the hand of nature (or by humans forcing the hand of nature). By contrast, when a species dies off, extinction is brought about by a failure to replace those members of the species whose lives come to an inevitable natural end.” (p.195)

And argues against one of them:

“There are clear differences between the two. Most obviously, killing-extinction cuts lives short, whereas dying-extinction does not. Although it may be bad for anyone of us to die, it is still worse to die earlier than we need to. Secondly, there is a moral difference between some cases of killing-extinction and cases of dying-extinction. Were anti-natalists to become pro-mortalists and embark on a ‘speciecide’ programme of killing humans, their actions would be plagued by moral problems that would not be faced by dying-extinction. Humans killing their own species to extinction is troubling for all the reasons that killing is troubling. It is (usually) bad for those who are killed, and unlike dying (from natural causes), it is a bad that could be avoided (until dying occurs). Although we can regret somebody’s death from natural causes at the end of a full life span, we cannot say that any wrong has been done, whereas we can say that a moral agent killing somebody, without proper justification, is wrong.” (p.196)

In this paragraph, as well as in interviews and other papers, Benatar emphasises that he is not a pro-mortalist. Some argue that Benatar’s version of antinatalism entails pro-mortalism, but Benatar insists that it doesn’t. His reason is that since non-existence always has an advantage over existence, it is always better not to start a life, but once life has started, existing persons have interests to continue living so we must not act to cut their lives short or stop them once they have started. In fact he claims that death is another reason to be antinatalist “coming into existence is bad in part because it invariably leads to the harm of ceasing to exist” (p.213).

In this post I’ll argue that despite his repudiation attempt, Benatar’s version of antinatalism does indeed entail pro-mortalism, and more importantly, that there are other much stronger reasons to be pro-mortalist and pro-extinctionist, independent of any of Benatar’s arguments.

Extinction and Pro-Mortalism

Benatar argues in the article Every Conceivable Harm:A Further Defence of Anti-Natalism that:

“by itself, the asymmetry argument is insufficient to yield the antiatalist conclusion. It shows that it is better never to come into existence. It does not show how great a harm it is to come into existence. The second argument – what I shall call the quality-of-life argument – reveals the magnitude of that harm. However, the quality-of-life argument can also be understood as a separate argument for the conclusion that coming into existence is a harm.” (p.146)

I’ve specifically addressed the quality-of-life argument in a former post so http://nonvoluntary-antinatalism.com/critical-review-of-better-never-to-have-been-part-4-the-quality-of-life-argument/please read it if you are not familiar with it. Basically the argument is that life is much worse than people tend to think it is, and the reason is that people’s self-assessment of the quality of life is extremely unreliable. Empirical evidence shows that most humans have an optimism bias, which leads them to overestimate the quality of their lives.

Such being the case, why is it only that coming into existence is a harm, but not existence itself? If life is as bad as Benatar argues it is, and if people’s self-assessments of the quality of life are so unreliable, then the fact that most of them state that their lives are worth continuing is also unreliable, and since according to Benatar, for the non-existent, the absence of pain is good, but the absence of pleasure is not bad, then it seems that Benatar’s antinatalism do entails pro-mortalism.

However, as mentioned earlier, Benatar argues against pro-mortalism, and one of his reasons is that he thinks death itself is a harm. When Benatar, like many others for that matter, claims that death itself is a harm, they don’t mean that the dying process is bad for the person who is dying, which is obvious, nor the harm of being aware that death is bound to happen someday, or the feeling that it’s coming close and etc. which is obviously bad for the one who experiences it. Both cases, dying and death in the mentioned sense, are bad experiences, but only as long as a person is still alive. The dead are no longer bothered with dying or death. Another point worth mentioning for that matter is that this claim is not made about others who are harmed by the death of a person. The case in point is whether death is bad for the one who died. And oddly, Benatar’s answer is yes, death is bad for the ones who died because it leads to the harm of ceasing to exist. In other words, for Benatar, death is a sort of deprivation. That is odd since the dead can’t experience any of the effects of their death. In fact they can’t experience anything hence can’t be deprived of anything. A state can’t be bad for someone if it doesn’t have bad consequences for that someone (or any consequences whatsoever in the case of death). It is often argued that death frustrates the wishes of the dead, but the dead can’t be frustrated. There is no one who experiences the loss of the goals which won’t be accomplished. No one is there anymore to be a victim of this “frustration”. This claim can only make sense if wishes were moral entities. There is no morally relevant agent who wants these wishes but is deprived by death.

Another reason why this claim is odd is that Benatar is the philosopher who argues that “The absence of pain is good even if that good is not enjoyed by anyone; but the absence of pleasure is not bad unless there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation”. So it seems that, especially in his case, it would be more plausible to argue that not only that the sooner human extinction comes the better, but that human extinction is a moral imperative. That is since it is preventing bad experiences from innumerable generations, with no negative effect, and since arguing that something is better, ethically compels (surly in this unequivocal case) an intervention to make it happen. After all, to stand idle while generation after generation spawns an unimaginable amount of suffering, is complicity.
Benatar explains the oddity by arguing that while non-existing persons don’t have an interest to live, existing people do have an interest to live, so it is a different scenario.

First of all, Benatar’s argument that death is a harm that adds to already bad life significantly undermines his argument that life is a serious harm. If life is as bad as he argues it is, then death should be viewed as salvation from harmful lives, not another harmful aspect of them. It is a harm that ends all other harms. So for death to be another harm and not a relief, the other harms must be not as bad as he argues they are.

But even if we accept that it is a different scenario and therefore doesn’t necessarily entail pro-mortalism, it is definitely not sufficient as a reason against extinction brought by killing, since to make that case Benatar must think that not only that existing people’s interests in continuing to exist (which is in itself flawed given the psychological features which distort their ability to make objective assessments of the actual quality of life and constitute instead a fallacious positive assessment) subdue their own suffering in life, but that they also subdue the suffering of all the future generations.
Even if death isn’t a benefit since it ends horrible lives, but really another harm in horrible lives, in order to oppose extinction brought by killing, Benatar must argue that the harm of cutting the lives of existing people short (which in itself should be doubtful since Benatar thinks that the absence of pleasure is bad only if there is somebody for whom this absence is a deprivation) overcomes the harms of anyone who would ever be born if the lives of existing people won’t be cut short. It is reasonable only if you think that life isn’t that bad. But Benatar does think so. If Beantar had only argued that it is better never to have been created in the first place since non-existence has an advantage over existence, then he could plausibly argue that his version of antinatalism doesn’t entail pro-mortalism. But he does argue that life is a harm. His antinatalism is not pure logic, meaning solely based on the logical conclusion derived from his asymmetry. He really cares about suffering. And that’s what makes his pro-life argument so strange. His support of what he calls ‘dying extinction’ is self-explanatory, however I fail to understand his opposition to ‘killing extinction’, especially when he of all people, is basing it on the opposition to cut existing people’s lives short. How can he seriously balance all the suffering of all the sentient creatures who would ever be created with the suffering of the existing people had their lives been cut short?
And given that non-existing have no interest in coming into existence, so they are not harmed by not coming into existence (he of course argues that they are harmed by coming into existence), then actually the opposition to human extinction if brought by killing and not by dying off, is favoring the sacrifice of anyone who would ever be born, for the sake of not hurting the interests of existing people whose lives would be cut short.

Although in supporting ‘dying extinction’ he is in favor that there won’t be future generations, his support of ‘a right to procreative freedom’ (claiming that if the state would actively prohibit reproduction it would require highly intrusive policing and invasions of privacy since people would refuse to obey this law) practically allows and accepts the creation of future generations. In addition, it is not that he opposes extinction brought by killing because of the option of ‘dying extinction’, but he opposes extinction brought by killing because killing is wrong, period. Even if there was no other way to prevent all the suffering of all the generations that would ever exist except by killing the current one, he would oppose it. And so despite that he is in favor that there won’t be future generations, he conditions this support with unethical terms.

Even if we accept the claim that people’s interests in continuing to live can be an argument against killing-extinction (despite that there is something very inconsistent when it comes from someone like Benatar who thinks that people’s self-assessments of quality of life are extremely unreliable, and that life is so bad that they mustn’t ever start, and since he is supposed to think that death is not bad for the dead considering that he argues that the absence of pleasures are bad only if there is someone for whom this absence is a deprivation), people’s interests in continuing to live is not a valid argument against extinction even if brought by killing, when it is at the expense of others. The interests of existing people are not negated but are set aside by bigger interests of many more subjects – the billions of subjects who are harmed by the existing people. Every human who continues to live means thousands of others who would continue to suffer as a result. Even if death has a cost, and it always has a cost, there is a much bigger cost for life. The main motive behind pro-mortalism isn’t the neutral nature of death for the ones who died, but the cruel nature of life for the ones who are living. It is not the fact that death is not bad for the one who dies, it is the fact that life is bad for the ones who are forced to live horrible lives because of that person.
The interests of current living humans can’t be seriously compared with the interests of generations upon generations of sentient creatures, who would otherwise be forced into a life of suffering.

I believe that the fact that death is not bad for the one who dies, mainly makes the dilemma much easier. But the main motive is that human extinction would prevent the suffering of trillions of nonhumans, as well as generation upon generation of frustrated humans who would continue to be forced into existence with different levels of misery.
Each human is not only suffering in life (and so non-existence is better than living for that person), but is first and foremost a little exploitation and pollution unit. The death of a person is not bad for that person, and it is good for many others.
And in a broader scale, the little good that humanity has brought to this world is concealed in the ocean of misery that it caused. Wherever humans have set their foot they have murdered, exploited and demolished. That includes each other, other species, and the environment.

Weighting the counterfactual desire of dead people to continue their existence against the concrete suffering of many more people, means that Benatar doesn’t take seriously enough his own quality of life argument. And that’s in the better case, in the worst one he is being cruel and speciesist as most of humans’ victims are animals, and they already significantly outnumber existing people. Trillions of sentient creatures would be forced into a miserable existence just so the interests of much less creatures, who are also their victimizers, won’t be violated. What about the interests of hundreds of billions of chickens who can’t spread their wings? What about the interests of tens of billions of pigs who don’t know what it is like not to feel pain? And the interests of tens of billions of ducks who never feel water or clean air throughout their entire lives? Their suffering is extremely greater than would be the suffering of the last generation of humans, were it on the brink of extinction. Therefore I think it is justified that human extinction would be initiated by people who care about others, obviously with minimum harm and as fast as possible. The best way I can think of to accomplish that is forced sterilization.

The amazingly sad thing is that during a podcast hosting Benatar, Sam Harris presented a human extinction scenario in which no one suffers and Benatar rejected it anyway. Harris asked him why would it be a bad thing for everyone to die tonight painlessly in their sleep without knowing that this is their last day, and without even experiencing it, and with no one around to know that it has even happened? Benatar replied that those of us who do exist, have an interest in continuing to exit, they have an interest to not be annihilated.
The power of this thought experiment lays in showing how human chauvinism is so deeply rooted. Even the suggestion of human extinction with no human ever being aware or experiencing it, is being rejected. It is beyond me how Benatar can think that existence is always bad, but the painless death of everyone is worse.
Condemning such a dream like scenario is complete evil. The claim that in the name of what the dead would have wanted if they were still alive (but currently don’t want anything and are not hurt by anything), he would sacrifice everyone who would ever suffer in this cruel world, is one of the harshest things I can imagine.
Preventing the human race from procreating using a virus or a bacteria or something of this sort which cause sterilization, is not as ideal as Sam Harris’ thought experiment, but it is probably the least harmful way of stopping the most harmful species ever in the history of this planet. And that is one of greatest things I can imagine.

References

Benatar, D. Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Benatar, D. Every Conceivable Harm: A Further Defence of Anti-Natalism
S. Afr. Journal Philos. 2012, 31

Benatar, D. Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics
Journal of Ethics (2013)

Feldman, F. Some puzzles about the evil of death in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Luper, S. Annihilation in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

McGregor, R. and Sullivan-Bissett, E. 2012: “Better No Longer To Be: The Harm of Continued Existence” The South African Journal of Philosophy

Pitcher, G. The misfortunate of the dead in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Rosenbaum, S. How to be dead and not to care in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Suits D. B. Why death is not bad for the ones died in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Critical Review of “Better Never To Have Been – Part 5 – Abortion: The ‘Pro-Death’ View

In the fifth chapter of the book Benatar offers his argument for abortion, a ‘Pro-Death’ View as he calls it.
Basically the idea is that since coming into existence is harmful, and since at least during the earlier stages of pregnancy, one has not yet come into existence in the morally relevant sense, people mustn’t give a justifiable reason for having an abortion but for not having one.

It is the failure to abort which must be defended he argues, and adds that the greater the harm of existence, the harder it will be to defend that failure. And if life is as bad as he suggests it is – then the failure to abort (at least during the earlier stages of pregnancy) may never, or almost never, be justified.

I agree that people mustn’t give a justifiable reason for having an abortion but for not having an abortion, only for different reasons than Benatar’s. His first premise – that the creation of a new person is always harmful – is correct, but as opposed to what Benatar means when he claims that, the creation of a new person is always harmful first and foremost for other sentient creatures who would be harmed by that new person. And harming them can never be justified.
The harms to others are so severe that it nullifies the harm of abortion even when performed after the fetus has already reached the morally relevant stage. Arguing otherwise is suggesting that the interest of a fetus, even if already conscious, is more important than the interests of all the existing sentient creatures who would be harmed if that person is born. That is morally wrong.

Considering the harms to others and not having an abortion could never be justified, and considering how severe the harms to others are, abortion at any stage is always morally justified.

Some argue that abortion is wrong since it deprives a person of the value of its future. But such an argument forces us to think that it would be worse to kill a fetus than to kill a thirty-year old, since a fetus, all things being equal, would have a longer future, and would therefore be deprived of more. Most people find that preference unacceptable. Benatar provides an explanation why:

“The greater deprivation makes sense when we are comparing the death of a thirty-year old with that of a nonagenarian, where most people take the former to be worse. However, it makes much less sense when comparing the deaths of the fetus and the thirty-year old, where many of us take the latter to be much worse. The best explanation for this is that a fetus has not yet acquired the interest in its own existence that the thirty-year old has.
The case of the thirty-year old and the nonagenarian can be explained in one of two ways. It could be that both have equal interests in continued life but the nonagenarian has less life left. Alternatively, in some cases only, it could be that the nonagenarian’s interest in living has already begun to decline, perhaps on account of life’s becoming worse with advancing age and decrepitude.” (p.159)

There is another reason to prefer abortion over killing a thirty-year old, and that is since the latter had already passed 30 years of causing suffering, while the fetus still has a lifetime of inflicting suffering on others. The main ethical reason to prefer killing the fetus over a thirty-year old is the time each has left to harm others. All things being equal, the fetus has 30 years more to inflict harms, so there is no dilemma.
Even if we look at it from Benatar’s view and not from the harm to others view, if life is as bad as he claims it is, then clearly it is better to kill the fetus who has a lifetime of suffering ahead, while the thirty-year old at least has 30 years less to suffer.

Having said that, Benatar nevertheless seriously argues for a right to procreate:

“If a right to reproductive freedom were withheld in order to prevent harm to those who would be brought into existence, the state could then either simply let people exercise reproductive choices without having a right to do so, or it could actively prohibit reproduction. The first option would be pointless. If the point of withholding an entitlement to have children is to prevent the harm of bringing people into existence, why withhold an entitlement to have children only then to permit people to have children?
Withholding the right would have to bfocusing on the harms to humans[r1]
[r1]Link to 1e linked, therefore, to a prohibition on having children. However the argument in defence of a legal right to reproductive freedom might go, procreative prohibition simply would not work. People would find ways of breaking the law. To enforce the law, even partially and unevenly, the state would have to engage in highly intrusive policing and the invasions of privacy that that would entail. On the plausible assumption that coitus itself should not and cannot effectively be prohibited, the state would have to be able to distinguish between those, on the one hand, who conceived wittingly or negligently, and those, on the other hand, who conceived accidentally. In either case, the state would then have to require abortions. In the case of the unwilling, this would require physically restraining people and performing unwanted abortions on them. The threat of this would very likely drive pregnancy underground, with women gestating and giving birth on the quiet. This, in turn, would very likely increase pregnancy- and parturition-related morbidity and mortality. These sorts of moral costs are immense and there is a powerful case to be made for the view that they are not outweighed by the benefits. This is particularly so given that the full benefits are unlikely to be obtained, given that much procreation would not be prevented by a prohibition on producing children.” (p.106)

It is strange that despite his claim in chapter 2 that it is always better never to have been, and despite his claim in chapter 3 that coming into existence is a very serious harm, he makes such an argument. Earlier in the book he also argues against that parents with dependents are somehow thought to count for more: “If, for example, there is some scarce resource—a donor kidney perhaps—and of the two potential recipients one is a parent of young children and one is not, the parent, all things being equal, will likely be favoured. Increasing one’s value by having children might be like increasing one’s value by taking hostages. We might find it unfair and decide not to reward it.” (p.12) Isn’t it a similar case when the right to procreate is justified by the fear of an Orwellian surveillance? If he can that easily defend the right to procreate doesn’t it significantly enfeebles the validity of his basic arguments? If life is as bad as he claims it is, can a surveillance society, as bad as it is in itself (and it most definitely is terrible) be compared with the harms of life? Even without considering the harms to others it is highly doubtful. And when considering the billions of sentient creatures being imprisoned for their entire lives, when considering the billions of sentient creatures being genetically modified so they would provide the maximum meat possible for the to-be born persons, when considering the billions of sentient creatures being forced to live without their family for their entire lives, when considering the billions of sentient creatures who suffer from chronic pain and maladies, when considering the billions of sentient creatures that can never breathe clean air, walk on grass, bath in water, and eat their natural food, when considering the billions of sentient creatures being violently murdered so the to-be born could consume their bodies, when considering the billions of sentient creatures whom their habitats are being destroyed and polluted, when considering the billions of sentient creatures being skinned alive, castrated, burned, poisoned, kicked, dehorned, detailed,  mounted, chained, experimented on, enslaved, it is totally unquestionable.
How can a life of extreme suffering ever be compared with outlawing procreation? Or even forced abortion? Can anything be compared with lifelong suffering with not even one painless second?

Don’t get this wrong, I agree that procreative prohibition won’t work completely, and I agree that it has tremendous moral costs, however, one must be extremely speciesist to think that they are not outweighed by the benefits. This is another problem with focusing on the harms to humans, when considering the harms to others there is no doubt what must be done.
Benatar himself mentions something of this sort as a solution to the expected problems involved in procreative prohibition:

“We can certainly imagine a society in which non-procreation could be widely (even if not universally) ensured without the invasions of privacy and bodily intrusions described above. This would be so if a safe, highly effective contraceptive substance could be widely administered without the knowledge of the population or the consent of individual people—in the drinking water, for example, or by aerial spray. A state in which this were done would avoid the horrendous image of Orwellian surveillance, or forced sterilizations and abortions, and so on. Of course, it would still be violating personal autonomy, but this, we have already seen, is not sufficient to make the case for a legal right to produce children.” (p.107)

With that I couldn’t agree more. It is much more likely to work, and it avoids the harms of procreative prohibition. It also doesn’t require a broad consent or state intervention or operation. All it takes is highly devoted activists with the right idea and resourcefulness, and hopefully finally the cruelest species ever would gradually go extinct, along with all the suffering it is forced to endure, and all the suffering it inflicts on others.

References

Benatar, D. Better Never to Have Been (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006)

Benatar, D.. Every Conceivable Harm: A Further Defence of Anti-Natalism
S. Afr. Journal Philos. 2012, 31

Benatar, D. Still Better Never to Have Been: A Reply to (More of) My Critics
Journal of Ethics (2013)

Feldman, F. Some puzzles about the evil of death in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Luper, S. Annihilation in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Pitcher, G. The misfortunate of the dead in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Rosenbaum, S. How to be dead and not to care in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

Suits D. B. Why death is not bad for the ones died in Life, Death and Meaning (Lanham MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004)

« Older posts Newer posts »